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DOLLJ1.R FO~ DOLLAR : A CAJADIA "10NETAqy PROBLEM 
A. 'I'he Problem 
The rate of exchang e for the Canadian dollar si n ce 
Se p temb er 3 0 , 1 950 , has been determined by conditi ons of sup-
p ly and demand for forei gn currencies in Canada . The rate 
of exch ange , in relation to the American d ollar, has sett led 
a round 95 cents with little fluctuation in either direc t ion 
since t h at date . In re ce n t month s Canada has been enjoying 
unpre cedented p rosperity . Business ha s been g ood, the de-
mand for Canadian products has i n cre ased , and t h ere has b e en 
a flood of American capital ac ross the border. 
The fact t h at a free l y f l uctuating exchans e rate 
and busin ess p rosperity exist simultaneously does not mean 
that on e is a c ause and the other an effect . A fixed ex -
chaDge re_te, c a r efully s e lected, woul d produce the same busi -
ness p rosperi t y , but on a sounder and more permanent basis . 
A fluctuating exchange r a te impedes leg itimate trade b e cause 
it introduc es an added e lement of risk in al l business t r a ns-
a cti ons, e speci ally t h ose of a long - term nature. At t he same 
time such an exchange rate encour a g es s pe culation, wh ich is 
an undesirable stimulant to bus ine ss . It is the contention 
of this t hesis that t he United St a tes and Canada should im-
medi ate l y institute a program, t h e p urp ose of whi ch would 
be to establish and ma intain s table exchange ra t es b etween 
the t wo countries . 
5. 
In 1 931 t h e l eading n 2.tions of the wor l d aband oned 
t h e g old standar d whi ch had automatic a l ly se t t h e limits 
with in wh ich exchange r a te s c ou l d f luctua te. During the fol -
lowing de c ade compe titi v e currency depreci a tion be c ame co~­
mon practi c e in many countries, i nc luding t he United St a t e s 
and Canada . Currency depreci a tion p rov ide d only a temporary 
adv ant a ge to t he country which r es orted to its use . In ret -
ro spect, it is obvious t ha t the wide l y fluctuating e x change 
rate of t he thirt ie s a ggr a v a t ed the world 's e conomic p roblem 
and wa s a contribu ting factor in prolong ing the great depres-
sion . 
I t wa s the a l most universal recognition of the 
evi l s of c urrenc y inst ability in t h e thirti e s which l ed to 
t he Inte.r n a tional Jvlonet a ry Confere nce a t Bretton l;oo d s in 
1 944 . A direct resu lt of t he mee ting wa s t he establishme nt 
of t he Interna tiona l Monetar y Fund . Its purpos e wa s to con-
trol exc h ang e r a tes, stabili ze c urrencies, and t hus indi-
rec tly encourage world trade a nd prosperity . The Fund p er-
mits currency depreciation but only within limits prescrib ed 
by the c h arter . 
Canada and t he United St a tes we re among t h e sign -
er s of t h e ori g inal a g reement. Si n c e 1 946 Can ada has on sev -
eral oc c as ions alte red the exchang e r a t e of the Can a di a n dol-
l ar i n re l ation t o the United States dollar. She has done so 
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t hrough t h e proc edure outlined and recommend e d by t he Inter-
na tiona l Monetary Fund. Ea ch s ucceeding adjus t ment h as been 
made wi th the full r ealization t hat it was a temp ora ry meas -
ure and t het further adj us t ments would have to be made at a 
l a ter da te. The maj or reasons which Canadians felt justified 
such adjustments were: 
1. Shortage s of r e s erves of forei gn exchange, chi efly 
of United St ates doll ars. 
2 . An unfavorable balance of trade wi th t he United 
St a tes. 
3 . Canada had granted extensive credit to forei gn c oun-
tries as a direct r e s ult of the war. 
4 . Inf l ati ona ry trends in the United States threatened 
to s pread to Canada . 
5. Mai ntenance of existing price and wa g e levels in 
Canada made such adjustments nec e ssary. 
6 . Currency s p eculators, anticipating a c h ange in t h e 
exchange rate, were eng a ging in act ivitie s which 
were aggrav a ting the forei gn exchange probl em . 
Ad justments which have been made in the exchang e 
rate to mee t these very serious probl ems have provided temp o-
rary relief . However , the fr equency of these adJustments is 
i n itself an eff ective trade barri er, a nd c an only le ad to 
more intensive spe c u l ati on in t he currenc ies of the t wo na -
tions concerned. The l a test remedial measure, t h e fre e ing 
of t he Canad ian doll a r on Seotember 30, 1 950, does not 
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n rovide a pePmanen t solution to any of these problems. Specu-
l ation in CB.nadian d ollar s has been reduced but by no means 
e liminat ed. Investment money continues to flow a cross the 
border in record amounts, much of which represents a contin-
ued fli ght from t he American dollar. Inflation has had its 
effect in Canada as in the United States. Price and wag e 
levels continue to rise. 
If the rearmament race should slow down and the 
demand for Canadian products decline, it is doubtful whether 
the Dominion would want to continue wi t h a freely fluctua t-
ing dollar. It is far more probable t ha t the Canadian dollar 
would b e pe bged at a substantial discount to the American 
d ollar. This would pave the wHy for a nother serie s of ad -
justments similar to those made in the period 1946 to 1950. 
Canada is faced with the prospe ct of constantly 
recurring financial crises. An effective answer to the prob -
lem cannot be found wi t hin the framework of the International 
Monet ary Fund a s it exists today . The science of interna-
tional trade is very complex, and a paper of this type could 
not contain all the answers . However, a general analysis of 
the forei gn exchange problem is presented, a nd a p l Hn is sug -
gested which may be helpful in reaching an ultimate solution. 
B. Importance of the Study 
Prosperity based primari ly upon rearmament will 
not l a st indefinitely. Toda.y's current events seem to 
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indicate that large scale war p roduction will continue for 
many years in the future. It must not be forg otten, however, 
that public opinion and world events can, and do, chang e 
quick ly. If Russia became convinced she could not win a war 
wi th the We s t, she mi ght undertake a peace offensive, which 
would prove very a ttractive to the ~estern powers . This is 
but one of t he many p ossible eventuali ties which could burst 
t he bubble of prosperity which Canada ha s been enjoying for 
t h e pas t year . If t h e bubb le should burst, Canada c ould 
ve r y easily find herself burdened with a bi lli on dollar defi -
cit in he r current account with t he United St a tes, as wa s 
t he case as rec ently as 1 947 . 
The present Canadian prosperity is directly trac e -
ab l e to t he abnormally l a r g e forei g n de~and for he r export -
able surplus a nd to the tremendous inf l ux of Americ an capi -
tal . The latter would be r edu ce d to an insignificant fi gure 
if the forei gn demand f or e xports de clined appreciab ly. 
Eu ropean recovery and a slow-down in rearmament would me an 
t h e d is apue a r ence of the present seller's market. The dura -
tion of t he business boom is uncertain, but that it will end 
i s ine vitabl e . Canada shoul d be ~ in i @nediately a program 
desi g ned to maint a in he r exuorts t o the United States a t a 
high level af ter t he r earmament has s lowe d d own. 
Instability in t he e xchange rates is an effe ctive 
barrier to tra de bet ween t he t wo nations. It i ntroduces a n 
adde d e lement of risk into every business contra ct between 
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an Ameri can and a Canadian firm. It makes it impossible to 
make the most efficient use of natural resources. It ret ards 
the specializati on of l ab or, one of the most important fac-
tors in raising living standards . Pe r hap s t he most impor-
tant of a ll is t he effect upon capital i mport s and exports . 
F luctuating exchan_g e r a tes c a n des t r oy in a .few days the le-
g itimate return vvhi ch an investor i s ent i tled to .for the use 
of h is fund s . The yie l d that t he investor receives in nor -
~al times from a g ood Canadian security c a n be materially 
reduced by periodi c fluctuations in the exch ange rate . 
During 1 950 United St ates business~en invested 
over a bi llion d olla rs in Canada . Thi s was ~ore than the 
combined tctal of the pre ceding four years . This fact does 
not invalidate t he argwnent pre sented in the the si s. 1'he 
problem under discussion is of a long -term nature. The ex -
per ience of any one year cannot serve as a found a tion upon 
which to construct a practical solution. 
C. Definition o.f the Terms Used 
Dollar .for Dollar. The proposi tion of this thesis 
is that t h e Americ a n and Canadian dollars should be inter -
c han g e a ble . It is the long - run obj e ctive of the prop osed 
p lan rather than the immediate objective. The g old content 
of ea c h dol l ar would be identical. Both countries would co-
ope r ate to maintain the p arity. The Economic Planning Bo a rd 
would be desi gned to synchronize the economies o.f the t wo 
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nati ons . This in t urn wou l d mi n i mize t h e n e ed for pe riod ic 
dep a rture s f rom parity . The Equali zat i on Account wou l d p ro-
vide some e l a st i city i n t he p rop os e d p l a n. Only a ve r y s e -
r ious di s e quili br ium, s uc h as a Third iiv orld 11 ar, would make 
a d e p ar ture from p a rity nec es s a ry. 
Can a.di a n I(onet a ry Pro blem. Th e t h esis considers 
on l y t h e Cana d i a n exch ang e r ate p roble:n and the est ablish-
me nt of p arity between t h e Canadian and t h e Americ a n dollar s. 
Th e t wo n a tions are Ge ograph ic a lly contiguous, a nd econom-
ically a n d i deol ogi c ally s i milar . The se f a cts simplify t h e 
p robl e m. In ord e r to a p p ly the p rop os e d p lan on an interna -
tional l e vel would requi r e t he maintena nce of e conomic st a -
bil i t y be t we e n all n a tions involved. The difficulties p osed 
woul d be t he s ame a s those which confront t h e Int e rnation a l 
J\'1 onet a ry F und a t the p r e sent time. On an internationa l 
leve l the p lan just would not work . 
Pa ri!;[. A parity between t wo currencies is t h e 
p r i ce of one expr e ss e d in terms of t h e other, which is main-
t a i ne d over long p e rio d s of time, a llowing f or minor fl u ctu-
a ti ons due to ch ang es a rising daily in t h e forei gn e x c h ang e 
ma r k et. Thus a p arity i s a sort of equilibrium r a te of ex -
chang e , a center of economic gr avity a ro und which a ctua l quo-
tations move; it may be overvalued or underva lued in rela-
tion to another cur renc y r a te which will tend to be restored 
on c e t h e ma r k et qu ot a tion has d ive r ge d f r om it. The last 
f e ature of a mon et a ry p a r i ty is particul a rly i mportant : t he 
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parity must represent a rate around which , and i n the close 
nei ghborhood of which, ~ost of t he effectively quoted r a tes 
are to be found . 
PurchasiE.B_ Povve r Parity . The system in which t he 
foreign exchang e rates are determined by, and are in p rop or-
tion to, t he chang es in t h e relative domestic purchasing 
p owe r of the currencies under discussion . Instead of the 
g old wei ghts of t h e :nonete.ry units remaining constant with a 
varyi n g purchasing p owe r, we would have a constant purchas-
ing p owe r and a varying wei gh t. 
Under conventional systems the monet&ry unit is d e-
fined by wei ght in terms of a base :ne t al . The wei -ht of the 
uni t remains constant and purchasing p ower varies. Advocates 
of the purcha sing power pari ty system would have t he purchas -
ing povver of the mone tary unit remain consts.nt while p ermit-
ting t he monet ary officials to chang e the wei ght in terms of 
the base metal. 
Currency Depreciation . The term will be used i n 
this pap er a s a s ynonym for exchang e depreciation without 
any corollary i mp l i c a tion of a decline in t he interna l value 
of money . 
Currency deprecia tion is commonly used to denote 
decline in exchang e rates and decline in value in terms of 
economi c g oods. It will be used here only a.s referring to a 
de cline in t he ratio between one currency and other curren-
' cies re gardless of what happ ens to the gold content of the 
mone tary unit . 
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Freely Fluctuating Exchan~ Rates. This term will 
be used to describe t he monetary policy which permits the 
exchang e rate to be determined by the supply and demand for 
forei gn exchange in the money market. 
D. Organization of t h e Remainder of the Thesis 
The second cha.pter will be a brief resume of the 
underly ing fe.ctors which have played an important role in 
t he evolution of current Canadian monetary policies . Those 
p olicies have been formulated to meet the requirements of a 
nation whose economic survival is dependent upon the export 
of a substantial portion of its national product . In 1950 
Canadian gross national product was 17 . 5 billion dollars . 
Canadian exports were almost 20 per cent of this fi gure. 
The greater portion of these exports were the products of 
Cane.di an farms, forests, and mines . It would be impossible 
for Canada to consume these products domesti c ally, and a 
shift to the production of other types of g oods is imprac-
tical. Chapter II will explain briefly the specialized n a t-
ure of Canada's forei gn tra de wi th the United States and t he 
rest of the world. It will also outline the import a nce of 
capital imports to a nation which is still in the develop-
ment stage. 
In Chapter III various monetary theories are dis-
cussed . The first section on freely fluctuating exchang e 
rates shows the inconsistency of the Canadian action in free -
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ing t he dollar and the dec lared objectives of t he I nterna -
tiona l ~onet ary Fund . The susceptibility of fr ee l y fluctu-
Dting ex ch ange rates to spe cul a tive influences and their ef-
fect on all pri ces of interna tionally t raded go ods is p ointed 
out. Such rates wi ll be b enefici a l to a country only in t he 
short r un . 
The second section of this chap ter is a des crip -
tion of the purchasi n g p ower parity theory. It is seldom 
r e co~~ended as a s olu t i on to forei gn ech ang e problems but is 
very useful in an a na l ysis of t he effect of inte rnal price 
fluctuati ons up on t he exchang e rate. The t h eory woul d be 
uarticularly useful in t h e Economic Plann ing Boa rd which is 
pr op o sed in the t hes is. One of the functi ons of t h e Board 
is to ma intain a certain de gree of correlation between p r i ces 
and wage s in the t wo countries. The purchasing p owe r parity 
t he ory would be a us eful guide in formul ating corrective 
me asures to sustain such a correlation. 
The g old s t andard is reviewe d bec ause under that 
sy s tem exchan g e r a t e s we re ri g idly fi x ed . Stabi l i t y of ex -
chang e ra tes wa s at t a ined under the gold standard but a t too 
great an economic co s t. Any soluti on to the Canadi a n p rob-
l em which proposes stable exchange rates cannot be consid-
ered seriously unle ss it is free of the undes irable features 
of t he g old st andard . 
Curr ency depreci a tion is discussed briefly and t h e 
adv ant age s we i ghed against t he disadv antag e s . It is rejected 
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on the basis of this comparison . Compe titive currency depre-
ciat ion wi ll be used on t h e international level in the future 
despite interna tional monet a ry agreements. It does provide 
convenient, temp orary relief to a nation beset with forei gn 
exchange shortages. However, if the proposed plan is adopted 
by Canad a and the United States, competitive currency depre-
ci a tion be tween the t wo will be eliminated. 
Chapter IV is a critic a l analysis of t h e Interna-
tiona l i1I onetary Fund . A resume of the ma jor provisions in 
the a greement is included along with a description of the 
me c h anism of the Fund . The latter part of the chapter is 
g iven over to revealing the inadequacies of the F und. Few 
difficulties were encountered in getting t he members to agree 
on what the objectives of an international monetary agreement 
should be. The members, however, were unwi lling to commit 
t hemse lves to making t he necessary s a crifices which the a t-
t ainment of t h ose objectives would re quire. The result is a n 
ineffective organization. The concluding section demonstrates 
Canadian and Ameri can wi llingness to circumvent the organiza-
t ion 's announced objectives whenever it proves expedient. 
The Fund cert a inly offers no pe r manent solution to t h e Cana -
dian exchange r a te pr ob lem. 
Chapter V is an h istoric a l review of the Canadi a n 
ex cha n ge problem, particularly that of the l ast ten y e ars . 
It discusses t he a ctivi ti e s of the Canadian Ex change Board 
sinc e its or g anization in 1939. It des cribe s t h e p oorly 
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timed return to p arity wi th the United States dollar in July, 
1946, t h e loss of dollar reserves that resulte d, and the ef-
fects which followed t he imposition of import restrictions 
in 1947 . The final section deals with the changes which 
have t aken place within the last t wo years, and the factors 
which the Exchange Control Board considered justified the 
return to a freely fluctuating dollar. 
The following chapter presents in outline form a 
p roposal to form a North American Monetary Agreement whi c h 
would be simi l ar in many respects to t he international or-
ganization . Howe ver, the Articles of the newly formed or-
ganization would be designed to meet the specific needs of 
the two countries c oncerned . An Economic Planning Board is 
proposed which would promote e conomic coordination betwe en 
t he t wo countries. Its objective would be to maintain c or-
related pri ce and wage levels, living s tandards, and produc -
tion schedules. An Equ a lization Account would be set up to 
tak e c a re of the minor fluctuations in t he exchang e rate. 
The success of the Equalization Account would be assured by 
the operations of the Economic Planning Board in maintaining 
equilibrium in the current ac counts between Canada and t he 
United States. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOIHC FACTORS WHI CH Ff.A VE INJ:-~' LLJENCED 
CANADIAN MONETARY POLICY 
A. Ge ographical and Historical Considerations 
16. 
Canada beg an its existence as a buropean colony, 
and as such sh e was dependent upon Europe for many thing s 
essential to her economic progress . Today Canada, with a 
small population and an abundance of natural resources, is 
s till comparatively undeveloped. 
During the pa st fifty years the Canadian economy 
has expanded rapidly. The rate of expansion has been g reat 
because foreign countries have found it to their advantage 
to do busin e ss with Canada . The three most important ele-
ments contributed by foreigners are : 
1. Investment capital . 
2 . A market for exports. 
3. Capital g oods and consumer g oods. 
Although Canadians themselve s now supp ly 68 pe r 
cent of the tot a l business capital invested in that country, 
forei g ners still provide about 32 per cent. Foreign capital 
is vitally important in t h e f u ture de velopment of the coun-
try ' s vast resources . 
11 Canada 's living standard ha s g one up 50 per ce n t 
in the pas t ten years; in the United States the rise has been 
17. 
'' less tha n one-third. ·roday Cana da is t he one ma jor country 
i n the world that has a living s t andard comparable wi th t hat 
in the United St a tes." * 
The standard of l iving can only be maint ained e. t 
t ha t h i gh l evel by extensive tra ding with other countries . 
As Canada is indus tri a lized , she is becoming l e ss dependent 
upon fore i g n countries ; b u t be c ause of the hi ghly specialized 
nature of he r resources, s e can never attain self- suff iciency. 
Although Canada is sli ghtly l a r g er t han contine nta l 
United St ates in l and a rea, latitude and climate make n10re 
than half of it unproducti ve. It is one of t he most s pa rsely 
popul ated n a tions of t he world. Th e t o t a l p opulation is 
only about 1 4 mi llion peopl e . This fi gure reflects en in-
crea s e of 25 er cent s ince 1 939 . About one-half of t he 
popul ~tion is of British orig in and moderately under 3 0 pe r 
cent of Fre nch origin. The ren18. inder are a mixed group. 
He r do~inion status g ive s Can ada virtually comp l e t e polit-
i c a l fr e edom, but the inf luence of Britain is, nevertherless, 
s trong . 
Canada i s rich in many na t ural resources and is 
the world 1 s largest exporter of nonferrous ~net als and ne vJ s-
print. Her princ ipal exports to Europe are agricultural and 
animal products . Canada is today t h e world's third largest 
trader, being surpas s ed in this respect by only the United 
.;:-20' p . 4 2 
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States a nd t he United Kingdom . Toge t h er t h ese t hree coun -
trie s, for:ning t h e " North Atlantic 'f ri ant; l e, 11 ac c oun t for 
ab out 40 per cent of t he world 's merchandise exports . Canada 
and t he United St a tes a re eac h other' s best customer . Si x t y -
five pe r cent of a ll Canadian exports in the year 1 950 were 
shi pp ed to the United St a t e s. The trade in each di rection 
a .. 10unts to over t wo bi llion doll r.r s annually. 
Canada is dependent upon the United St a tes for 
practically a ll of her co a l and for about 25 per cent of he r 
steel. Unti l 1 947 she wa s e.lso dependent upon the Uni t ed 
St a tes for about 90 p er cen t of her pe troleum . The increase 
in the domestic supp l y of petroleum is dr amatic a lly de s cribed 
in the f ollowing quo t a tion: 
lfn tol d billions of d ollars have b een a dded to 
Canad a ' s wealth a s a result of t he oil discovery 
made by t h e I mperial Oil, Ltd., at Leduc, Al berta, 
i n February , 1 947. This wa s t e sPark t ha t set off 
t h e Canad i a n oi l boom . And t h is d iscovery in Leduc, 
19 :nile s s outh'~est of Edmonton, Al be rtB. 1 s capital, 
l ed off a series of strikes in 1 948 and 1 949 . In 
thre e short years Canada's oil rese rves jumped from 
35 million barrels to 1.2 b ill i on b a rrels; poten-
t ial output ro se to a pp roximate l y 145, 000 b a rre l s 
a d a y , or 40 pe r cent of Canadi an consQmption. 
In r e cent onth s t h ere have been other find s. 
No one i n Canada v. ill be sur prised i f reserves 
reach 2 bi llion b arrels b efore ano ther year rolls 
e.round. So:ne oi l g e ologists predi c t that reserves 
of 5 billion barrels will be p roved in western 
Canada within five y e a rs . And only a fr a ct i on of 
t he p rosp ective oil t e rr i tory has been scratche d 
in t ha t a r e . I t's likely tha t we s tern Canada ' s 
oi l fiel ds are one - t h ird as l a r ge as the oi l area 
in t h e United St ates . * 
-::2 , n . 45 
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Canada is a lso making great progress in the devel-
opment of her hug e desposits of iron ore on the Quebec-
Labrad or boundary . It is k nown that they cover an area of 
225 ~i les in leng th and 60 miles in width. It is expected 
t ha t wi thin five years the rate of p roduction will be about 
10 million t ons pe r year . In add ition, Ontario expe cts to 
increa se its ?roduction of iron ore by a million and a half 
ton s in the near future. A l gge percentag e of this increased 
production wi ll be shipped to the United States . Additional 
dollar exchange will t hus be made vailable v7 i t h which Canada 
c an pay f or much needed imports from the United States. 
Although Canada has long been makin - ste ady strides 
ahead in economic development, it wa s the Second h orld v~ ar 
which really provided the impetus to her industri a l strength 
today . Rntire new industries were established to make prod-
ucts formerly imp orted. She now manuf a ctures roller-bearing s, 
magnesium, synthetic rubber, opti c a l glass, penicillin, and 
sulphur drugs. apidly she is achieving industrial diversi -
fication. A s pe ctacula r growth in mining and industrial 
manufacturing have decreased the country's dependence upon 
a griculture . Industry now accounts for 31 per cent of t h e 
national income as a gains t 20 per cent fo r a griculture. A 
deficiency in coa l, which could be expected to reterd indu s-
trial advancement , is partially offset by an abundance of 
cheap hydro - e lectric power . Canada 's hydro -electric devel-
opment has been phenomenal, and v a st po ten ti a l source s still 
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r emain unharnessed. 
De s p ite h er traditional and e conomic ties with 
Brit a in, Canada, g eographicall y conti guous to t he United 
Stat e s, c a nnot easily reverse the trend toward s incre asing 
her tr a de ~ ith t he latte r. A fe w of t h e r e asons a re as 
fo llows: 
l . Transnortati on costs ma k e it much more e con om-
ical to purch ase many c ommodities such a s coal, 
oil, a nd citrus fruits from the United St a tes. 
2 . Canadian consumer demand for American products 
is constantly b e ing created through ne wspaper, 
ma gazine, and rad io advertisements. 
3 . Americ a n mark ets are the log ical outlet for 
Canad i a n industri a l and f a r m produc ts. 
B. Tra de with the United States 
Because they are geograph ic a.l nei ghbors, Canada 
a nd the United States shoul d be one another's best customers . 
However, free trade b etween t he t wo co untries has been i m-
p eded by Canada ' s tra ditiona l ti e s with Britain, artificial 
controls, tariffs, and exchang e r e tes. 
The interna tional economic situation supp orte d by 
an anal ysis of the s t a ti stics of recent year s ind ica tes that 
mutual trade between the t wo countries is increa sing and wi ll 
continue in t he same direction in t h e future. 
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Prior to the First V\ orld \\ ar, the United Kingd om was Canada's 
be st market; but averag ed over the l as t twenty-five years, 
exports to the Uni ted States and to the Unit ed Kingdom have 
been ab out equal. During t he l ast fifte e n year s a definite 
trend has been establishe d in favor of the United St a tes. 
The extent of the shift in Canadi a n trade is illustrated by 
the t able. The fi gures represent percent age s of total ex -
ports in dollars . 
Canadian Exports·::-
'I' o the u. s . To the u. 
'" · 
To oth ers 
1935 to 1939 36% 407; 24% 
1 950 65% 1 57~ 20~; 
In volume the same trend is indicated. In 1 950 
exports to the United Kingdo~ were only 58 per cent of pre-
war a verag e volu:ne . The volume of exports to the United 
St a tes during 1950 was 258 p er cent of the pre-war fi gure. 
The compar a tively weak financial status of Britain 
following t h e war and t he loss of her colonial sources of 
income hs.ve be en ma jor factors in the establishment of t his 
tre nd. The reversal of the trend within the forseeable f u -
ture is improbable . . 
Canada ' s exports to the United St ates are for the 
:nest part l umber, ne ws print, farm produc ts, nonferrous met-
~ls, and some manufactured items. Her imports fro~ the 
United St ates are chiefly consumer g oods, machinery , coal , 
-,·::- 3, p . 9 
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iron ore, citrus fruits , cotton , and t ex tiles. 
His tori cally, Canada ' s mn jor problem in tr fJding 
\'V i th the United :: tates has been n inequal i t y be tv reen exports 
end imnorts. Historic a lly, the l at ter have been of c;reater 
:ru::.2:ni tude, and t' e result has been a_ recurrine:_ do llar short-
a;;e . 1~ t the present time, the situs.tion is reversed, and 
doller reserves are at a near - record peak . 
The 10 per cent deval uation of t h e Canadian dol -
l ar in Sep te .nber 1949 DE.rrowed our e.dverse balance 
of trad e with the Uni t ed St a tes and stinul ate d specu-
lEI.tive inteeest in the future course o.f t he Canadian 
dollsr. .:lid -1 950 v;as t he bec;inning of an unprece -
dented flow of United Stat es inve s t~e nt &nd specu -
l ative capital into Canada . b etween t he 30th of 
June and the 30th of Sep t ember , gold and dollar re -
serves rose by 5:'S4 ·ni llion dollars of which 285 
11i ll ion dollars ca:.ne in during the month of Sep -
te~ber a lone. Such an inflow of capital p r esented 
a serious problem in exchange control and a. t hreat 
to ell :.neasures te1ten to r e lieve inflationary pres -
sures. l-n.nediate ac tion was cal l ed for, and on 
the 30th of Sep tembe r 1 950 , wi t h t he reluctant con-
sent of the Interr.a tional Monet a r y Fund, Cans.da re -
,noved the fixed exchange rate on the dollar and l eft 
it free to seek its own l eve l as d e termined by day -
to - day market conditions . . t the se_.ne time, re-
strictions on United ~tates f unds a v ai l ab l e for Ca -
nadian travel in t he United .S t a tes ~vere s r eatly :nodi -
fled . There has since "' eptember been so11.e wi thdrawe.l 
of funds from Canada ; reserves fell about 8 5 mi llion 
dollars between October and December but a re still 
over 200 mi lli on dollars abov e reserve holding s in 
1 946 when the do ll .s. r we.s revalued to par with the 
United States dolla r . * 
I t must be e:·nphasized that freeing the Canadian 
dollar has in no way solved. the forei gn exch&ng e problem 
which is under discussi.on . ?re:eing the O.o l l&r on Se p -
te·:nbe r 30 , 1950, has :ne rely reduced te 11porari l y the 
speculative interest in tlP Co.naclian doll ar . A t ruce 
-::-33 ' p . 3 
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in Kore a or a slowing in the pace of rearmament woul d mean 
t h e r e su:nption of spe c u l ative trading and :nake nevv ad jus t-
ments necess ary. 
The Korean ~ ar a nd t h e inflation created by the 
p rospect of large - scale deficit financing in the United 
St " t es were p rimary factors in produc ing Canadian g old and 
forei g n reserves of exchange in ex c ess of 1.7 billion dol-
lars as of Dece~ber , 1950. These factors cre ated en abnor-
:nal d ema nd for Canadien p roducts in the United States . It 
would be rashness to rely on t h e perpetuation of this abnor -
~nal demand as a solution to Canada 1 s econo:nic proble~ns . A 
return to co:.:tpe titive world trade is inevitable. Canad · 
must institute a long-ter~n program desi gned to restore some 
degree of stability to her exchang e rate. Otherwise , she 
wi ll be unabl e to maintain equi librium in her ba l ance ofpoy-
ments unde r ~ore normal circumstances. In the interim pe-
riod , whi le rearmament is proceeding rapidly, a stabilized 
exchange rate would effectively curb currency speculation. 
The triangular pattern of Canadian forei gn trade 
h as been a contributing f a ctor in the recurring dollar short -
a ge. Canada is still s e lling ab out 35 per cent of he r ex -
p orts ove rs e as. The maj or part of this trade results in an 
ac cumulation of pounds sterling a nd othe r forei g n currencies 
which are not readi l y convertible into Americ a n dollars . 
A s olution to t h e probl em woul d be facilitate d if 
Europe could reciprocate by providing the commodities Canada 
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n ow i mp orts from the United Stat e s. However, this is n ot 
physically possible at the present time; and even if it were, 
t h e economic waste which would result is objectionable. A 
country should i mport from. that source from which transpor-
t ati on costs are t he least, all other factors being equal. 
Canada, the United States , and t h e United Kingdom 
we re among the t wenty-three countries which became contract-
ing parties to t he General Agreement of Tarif f s and Trade, 
negotiated a t Gene va, Switzerland, in 1947. Under this ar-
r a n gement, they a greed to exchange certain specified tariff 
concessions, to give one another most f avored nation treat-
ment in matters of trade, t a riffs, and internal taxation, 
and to observe cer tain commercial provisi ons so f a r as these 
are not inconsistent with existing legislation. This has 
b een a step in t he ri ght direction but much rema ins to be 
done before satisfactory trade relationships can be brought 
into being . Doll ar parity c an be achieved, but it is con-
tingent upon a reasonable and cooperative tariff policy whi~ 
will foster rather than obstruct mutual trade. One of the 
functions of the Economic Planning Board proposed in the the-
sis would be to remove tariffs on many items in the inter-
ests of fr e er trade between the United States and Ca nada. 
In 194 7 the dollar shortage wa s responsible for 
Canadian restrictions upon American imports. A return of 
t h e Canadian dollar to parity on July 5 , 1946, was followed 
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by a s e rious drai n u p on t h e l a r g e reserv e of Americ a n dol l ar s 
whi ch had been ac c umul a t e d durin6 v' orl d ilv ~:_r II . Thi s must 
no t b e cons t r u e d a s a c on clusive argume nt agai ns t d ollar 
arity . Th e F ore i gn Ex change Con trol Boa r d must b e he l d r e -
s p onsibl e f or its c ontribution t o t he forc e s whi ch b rough t 
a bou t t ha t p a rti cu l a r undes ira b l e re a ction . Ex c h a nge p ol i -
c i es, t a riffs , othe r ar tifici a l g ove r nment a l control s , a nd 
imp roper ti~ing we re , a s a g r oup, t he f or ces wh i ch produc e d 
t h e unfor t una t e result s which f ollowed t h e r e st or a tion t o 
par i t y in J ul y of 1 94 6 . A de ci s ion u p on t he me r i t s of a f u -
t u r e retur n to par i t y should be withhe ld pend i n g a furthe r 
study of t he fo r ei gn exchan g e p rob l em . 
C. Tr ade wi t h Countrie s Ov e rs eas 
Can ad i a n overs ea s exports con sist chie f l y of fo od , 
l u!TI.b e r , n onferrous !TI.et1:1 l s , aut omob i l e s, ma chinery , a n d a v a. -
r i ety of mi sc e llaneou s produc ts . F ood products a c e t h e most 
imp ortant sing l e c a t e g ory , or dina r i l y a cc ounting for 30~ or 
more of t h e t o t a l e xp or t s. Th e Unit ed St a t e s mar ke t for Ca -
n a d i a n f ood produc ts is v e r y l i n it e d b e c a u s e America its e l f 
p rodu c es a sur p l us of t he same c ommod ities. Theref ore , if 
Canad a i s to export l a r g e quant i t ies of food i n t h e f uture , 
suc h e x p orts must , f or t he mo st p a rt, b e absorb e d by t h e 
ove r s e as f ore i gn market . 
The lo ss of t h e Britis h marke t is one of the ma jor 
p robl e ms c on_fr on ting Cana.da . Bri t ish purch as e s in Cana d a 
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de cl i ned 18 4 mi l lion dollars in 1950 . Prior to the Second 
J ~ orld v: ar, Brit a i n wa s Canada' s best custocner. She bou h t 
l a r Ge quant i ties of wheat, lumber, nd oth er products whi ch 
could n ot be sold e a sily in the United States . The full i m-
pact of t hi s sh ift in t h e p attern of Cana da ' s tra d e will n ot 
b e app a rent as long a s America, in t h e process of speedy re-
ar~a~ent, continues to absorb all of Canada's ex port a ble sur -
p l u ses. Brit a in and oth er European countries have been i m-
p overished by the \'b=J. r. Their purchasing power has b e e n so 
seriou sly i mpaired thE•. t it wi l l be many years before t h ey 
c an a.ssu.rne their pre-war i~portance a s markets for Canadian 
exports. 
The European standard of living has declined s a 
d ire ct r esult of the nar, and its restoration even to p re-
war l evels is going to b e impeded by a number of obstacles. 
Postwar n a tiona l budgets must provide for large expenditu res 
on national defense , repayment of forei gn l oans, and the 
maintenance of overseas possession s . 
The needs of Europe repre s ent, at l ea st potenti ally , 
an expanding mark et for Canadian exports . However, consid-
ering t h e unfavorable international ec on omi c c onditions wi t h 
v"i hich they must contend, i t would be folly for the Cana dians 
to p l an their own econo~y on the basis of European needs . 
Furopean abi l ity to pay is a much more realistic a pproach . 
An opinion as to the ability of Europe to p ay f or 
imports from Porth America in the future is presented in the 
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~ollowing quotation . It p oints out some o~ t he probl ems t ha t 
thi s t h esis seek s to answer . 
Can Europe in t h e ~uture exp ort enough to buy 
~rom North America, a t l eas t in pre - war quant ities ? 
The proble~ is lik ely to be con~used by much 
o~ the current t a lk about a chronic shortas e o~ 
dolla rs. There is no such chronic and ines c apable 
short e.ge . The re are v a rious circumstances which 
have eme r ged i n t he past a nd may recur in t he ~u­
ture i n which t h e econo~i c conditions o~ Europe 
may ~ind expression in a shortag e o~ dollars. 
Europe and t he Unit ed Kingdom, when r e constru ct ion 
is over, may prove capable o~ earning h i gh stand-
ard.s o~ living or only low s tande.rds o~ living ; 
but neither the one nor the other needs result in 
a shortage o~ dollars . I~ , o~ course, European 
countries at t emp t to maintain t heir currencies at 
hi gher externa l v a l uat ions than are appropriate to 
their long -run balance o~ payments, they will ex-
perience a short a g e o~ dollars. It wi l l be chronic 
only in s o ~ar a s the error in p olicy is ch ronic. 
To say the same thin6 another way, as long as in-
~lationary pressures a re strong in Europe and 
prices a re rising ~ ast er t h an in North Ame rica, 
stabilized exchange r a tes will give rise t o a 
shortage o~ doll ars~ I~ North A~erica develops a 
slump in bus iness, while Europe pres se s ahead with 
capital investment and housing expenditures, a 
short age o~ dollars wi ll be ~elt; but it will not 
b e chroni c unless t he North American recession is 
chronic . Again, if the ef~orts o~ Eur ope to price 
its g oods s o that t hey will sell in t he United 
St a tes market were to be o~fset by rising United 
St a tes t ari~~s or trade restrictions , dollars would 
be short . If the rate of i mprovement in t he ef~i­
ci ency of production is continuously more rapid in 
North Ameri c a than in Europe, t h en t h ere wi l l be a 
chronic shortage o~ dollars. The ability to com-
p ete is not abs olu te- - it is re l ative. The question 
is not, Can Europe compete? There is no doubt tha t 
i~ her exchange rates and prices are ri ght, if ob-
s tacles to her trade are reduced rather than in-
creased, a nd if sh e c an mai nt ain a comparable r ate 
of technical impr ovement, she c an compete. The im-
p ortant ques tion is: Wh a t income can she earn when 
she does compete? 
There is a g ood deal of current discussion 
which i mpli es that Eu ropean countries can in some 
way avoid the realiti es of these p robl ems. They 
c a nnot do so, but they may choos e to c oncea l them. 
If b y isola t ing the~selve s in their own e cono~ies, 
or in preferent i a l r egional arrang ements t hey suc-
c e ed in h a ving their products s e ll for hi gher 
prices (whi l e at the s ame time buying f ro m their 
friends t h i gher prices) their real stan d rd of 
l iving wi ll not be enh anc ed abov e t h .t p os sibl e 
throu gh sellin g in world markets . It wi ll be r e -
duced by r§ffion of t he l ess economi c use of their 
reso ur c es . -.. -
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Stabilize d excha ng e rates mus t no t be sought a s a n 
end in t h emselves . The economic we ll-being of t h e nations 
i nvolve d i s t h e u l t i mate g oal of e xcha ng e rate control. Sta-
b ili zed excha ng e r a tes between t wo countrie s, ri g idl y a dhered 
to, woul d be i mpractic a l where there was a fundamenta l dif -
f e rence i n t h e f l u ctuations of p rice l evels , st anda rd of l iv-
i n g , an d tech nolo J i c al advances in the r e s p e c tive e c onomi e s . 
Pa rity of t h e Ca na di a n and United St a t e s dollars is prop osed 
i n this t h e s is bec a use such fund ame n tal differences do not 
exis t b e t we e n t he economi e s of Canada end the United Stat e s. 
Dur i ng 1950 Cana da's tr ad e surpl us with nondollar 
c ountrie s ;a s considerably reduc ed . Surp l us in tra de with 
t h e Un ited Kingd om, which h a d b een running at a r a te of 400 
million dolla rs a y ear, dropped to 68 milli on doll a rs. At 
t h e s ame time t he deficit in tra de with the United Stat e s, 
wh ich in 1 947 h a d b e en dan g erous l y clo se to t he billion do l -
l a r ma rk, dropp ed t o 68 mi llion doll ~rs . 
-::- 5 ' p . 1 42 
2 9 . 
The se t wo factors have been interpreted by many as 
j_ndica ti ve of a tr e nd towards b al a nced trade ' c.nd of t he 
soundness of t he current Canad i an g overnment' s fo r e i g n ex -
cha n g e policy . Caution is ne c essary in a ppraising the l og ic 
b e h ind these conc l usions . The reduction in trad e surpluses 
with n ond ollar countries was the re sult of de cre as0d pur-
cha ses of Canadian e xports by ove rseas countries . The more 
near l y ba l anced ac count with t he United t ate s was t he d i-
rect r e sult of t he orean conflict. If t h e overseas market 
for C· nadian exports were to cont inue to decline, an d i f a t 
t he s ame time there we re a. s l a ckening in rearmament and in-
ventory stockpiling i n the United Stat e s, Canada would fa ce 
serious di ff ic ulties . 
The British preferenti a l system has in the past 
been of great benefit to Canada. ln t he v ar ious Domini ons, 
by ,'"lu t ua l agr e ement , t ari f fs up on i mp orted con:nod i ties from 
Canada we r e ke_ t at v ery low r ate s while simi l ar p roducts 
from countr i es outside the United Ki ng dom we r e subje c t to 
high p rotective t ar i ff s. Th us demand for' Canadian g oods was 
ar t i ficially sust ained at the expense of c ount r ie s out s ide 
the Unit ed Kin~dorn . 
Th e Dominions in recent years have fou nd the Brit-
ish preferenti a l system ha s mB.ny disadvantE!e,es . I 'he :nost i m-
p ort ant of these is the fact t hat trad in only with countries 
under t he preferenti a l sy ste~ prevents t he country so doing 
fro~:1 a c quiring Ameri c an dollars. The demand for d ollar s 
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tl1e \'.eaJ:enin; of the orefe rentir l syst e:l' . Tl1e future of 
.,.,_ cferFntic-· 1 :1lcrl~et s f or Canadian products is uncertaj n ct 
best . 
Sign ; ficantly , ~hile Canada h£s beer incre~s l~c 
~:cr o.;c oorts to ti1.e !.l l"ited .:3ta t es , she h&s .si.:mltaneously 
been rely in.; unon -~:le::>icb for 'tlore of her lm.ports . 'Le is 
n o; b tlyin;:~ 67 per c ent oi' all her · .~ported :::,oods f'ro 1J t.ne 
Ur.::.t e::3 ,:,tates, 2-S co.rlpared v.itr:.. -::-.1 ner c e r_t for t :i1c. yeE...rs 
19~~ to 1 939 . Cor.trasted ~ith tnis is tne rc.duct i on iL Grit-
ish i nn orts . Lnports fro:.l t e lEtter countr- _ ave de clined 
f:eo·n l E _?er cent of the l;otol Cr.nccUan L1noPts to 1 3 per 
cent in the s a~, e • -'l perl OL • Can<:>da, durin~ the past tv.o year~, 
: ... r· s bee r. ::u .. k i n-" E real C'f[ o·C't to incrce SC; British i 1.ports; 
btlt £1s r s u:!cess in t l1is directlo11 !"1rs b eer1 l ::__nited. 
In the ye ar 1 950 Ce nads est~bli shcd ~ ne~ r e c ord 
.for tot c. l i n ternc t:i.o na l 1 • ~USl l1€S S trc.ns £,c t e d. Interna ti cnc.l 
trajc by t he country 1 1950 ~~s C. 3 b illio1 ~ollcr s , con -
~a red ~:i th 5 . 7 b illion dol l a rs in 1949 . 2o~c v e r, ~hi l e t nbre 
s ll~nt de.sreG in the increase in the c ountry's to t r l 
cxnorts, it \.'&s not of stll': ici nt :ru:.6 ni t H1e to o.f.t'set tl.l.e 
s~-:& rp l~r e l i !loins i::r:JOf'ts . . ... s a result , Can&.df'. experi enc ed 
r-r:: unfavorab l e trade balc.nce foi' t!.1e first ti.. c since tt .. e 
E-E r l y l 92C ' s . 
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D. Capi tal Imoorts 
--·--
Las t year t h ere was a spectacul a r increase in 
f meric a n inves t ment i n Canada . A~e r i c an busine ss p ou red over 
600 mill ion dollars into Canadian p lants a nd equipment. In 
addition to t h is, Americ an invest or s purchased more t han 500 
~i llion dollar s worth of Cana di an securities . This 1 . 1 bil-
lion dollar total does not inc l ude reinvested earning s of 
American comoa nies . 
By Seo tembe r 1 950 Canadi ~n res e rves of gold a nd 
United ~ t ates d ollars re a ched a total of 1800 mi l lion dollars , 
~hi ch me a ns that they h Rd qu ad rup l e d in the s h ort spac e of 
three ye ars . On Se p tembe r 30 , 1 950 , Canada freed t he Cana-
dia.n d oll a r . The Minister of F inance a t t h e t i me expr essed 
t he h ope t ha t t he inflow of s p e cul a t ive c apital woul d cease . 
Ce rtainly a spect a c ul ar chan ge had take n p l a ce in 
~ very short period of t ime . In 1 947 Canadian r es erves of 
g old n d Uni t ed States do l l ars we re bein ' r apid l y reduc ed , 
and a so-c a lled unfavora ble bal ance of tr8de was d eveloping . 
'rhe Canadian g ov ernment dra s tic all y curtai led i !nports in or-
de r t o r e duc e t h e net c &pital outf low. By c ontrast i n 1950 , 
me a sur e s were being taken to halt t he net capital inflow · nd 
to ureclude t~ e further accumu l 8 tion of gold a nd d olla r re -
s e rves . 
There exist s currently a t end en cy t o a ttribute 
t h is chang e i n viewpo i n t on the part of American investors 
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to und erlying facto r s rath er t h a n to t h e primary c ause. It 
is s u ggested t ha t Americ a ns h ave only r e cen tly become aware 
of t he f ac t t h a t Canada ha s va st undeve loped areas, a stable 
g ov ernment, a n industrial potential, a nd an a ttrEctive co n -
sume r mar k et. These fa ctors have not c h ang ed e s sen ti a ll y 
s ince 1947, and are b e ing overstressed. The r eal a nswer is 
to be found in the Korean ~ ar and the effects of the rearma -
ment p r ogr a m. Since t he middle of 1950, the major c ausal 
f a ctor h a s been the flig ht from t he Americ an dollar broug h t 
on by t he threat of inflation. 
The following a rticle, written in the l a tter part 
of Novembe r 1950, indicates t h e s p eculative a spects of the 
s itua tion: 
It is a lready clear that the American money 
which p oured into Ca n a da during the su:nmer is in 
n o h u r ry to get out ag a in . Howe v e r ' hot' it may 
ha ve been when it came in, it seems to ha ve cooled 
off since the freeing of t h e dollar. One can only 
s pe cul a te on what the movement would have been if 
t h e dollar had be en r a ised to a new fi x ed val ue; 
but ob viously the temp tation for the speculator to 
t ake his profit a t once would h a ve been much gre a ter. 
The drop i n r e serve s ·would prob a bly h ave been much 
sha r p er tha n it is u nderstood to h a ve been so f ar. 
No fina ncial authorities h ere a re bank ing on the 
confidence in Canada b eing maint a ined at the sEune 
hi gh level indefinitely. New York h a s h a d a wave 
of extremely ' bullish' sentiment about t h is coun-
try . There seems no reason why it should chang e; 
but Ca nadian authoriti e s r emark that when New York 
sentiment does change at all, it is li able to 
ch ang e violently. ' In New York , 1 s a id one finan-
cier here, 'th ey ' r e a ll bulls or a ll bears.' 
The movement of c apital was primari l y respon-
sible for Canada' s dollar revaluation , a nd it ma y 
be held to be a t le a st par tly unre l i able bec ause 
of the l a r g e p sycholog ica l e lement involved.* 
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Actua lly the Canadi an government h a s pursued a 
p ol i cy since t he ear l y thirties whic h has successfully dis -
courag ed fo r ei gn investment in Canada . Fre quent chan ges in 
t h e e x chan g e rate have been a contr ibuting f a ctor in produc -
ing t h is effect . There has b e en a dec line in the over-all 
p ercentag e of forei gn ownership of Canadi a n industry from 38 
per cent in 193 9 to 32 p er cent in 1 948 . 'rhe decline, how-
ever , d oe s not extend to manuf a cturing whe r e the percent age 
of f oreig n owner sh ip has risen from 42 to 45 per cent. The 
d e clines i n oth er ma jor c a te gories in the s ame period h ove 
b een mining a nd smelting 3 p er cent, s te a~ rai l wa y s 1 3 p er 
c ent, a n d i n othe r u tilities 10 per c ent . It is estimated 
t h a t since 1 948 there h as b e en a further decline in the over-
all p erc e ntag e of forei gn ownersh ip in Canad i a n industry . 
The increas e d i mp ort a nce of manufacturing a s a n 
i n v es t ment ou tlet follows t h e general tendency of Canada 's 
ind u stri a l growt h . Ma nuf ac turi n g op e r a tion s we re gre atly 
e xpand e d dur i n g the war . The p ostwar doll a r shortag e a nd 
t h e pent-u o d emand for consumer g o ods s purred exp a n sion 
a lon g t h is line . More t han 2 , 000 Americ a n c ontrolled comp a -
n ie s a re n ow doing 2 5 p er c e nt of a ll ma nufacturing in Ca-
n a da. Direct inve s t ment s in s u b s i di a rie s and branch pl ant s 
-!,·29 , pp . 896- E97 
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ec count for 50 per cent of the tot a l American inve s t ment in 
Cianada . 
Taxes , pri c e control s , l abor difficulties, and a 
h ost of z overn11e n t re gu l a t ions , whi c h are the dire c t resul t 
of the lCorean situation , are worrying P. erican business~en . 
Branch p l a nts es tabl ished in Cana a a ppear to offer a hedg e 
aca inst t he se obstruction s t o corpor ate profit. The Canadian 
c;overnment has no t kep t pace with t he United St a tes in the 
i !:~posi tion of taxes 8.nd control s as a resul t of the present 
emer 're ncy . Howeve r, an ee si n g of internat ional tension would 
reduc e the demand for Canadian s oods and, at t he sa~e time , 
el :imina te :nuch of t '1e incentive f or Ameri c an business expan-
sion in Canada . Barring an a l l - out war, the American r e rma -
~ent nros r am vfi l l n ot c ont inue indefinJ tely to a bs orb vas t 
quantities of im orted g o ods . Once t h e p l a nned expansion of 
d efen se p otential has been bui l t up , t he emphasi s wil l be 
l)la ced up on ~aintenance rather> t han upon fur t her expansion 
of this p otenti a l . 
; hen surpluses r ep l a ce shortages, as t hey inevit-
ab l y wi ll, the n the Ca nad i n exchan;;e rate will 8ssume its 
p re - Korea i.. por t anc e . ~ ith he r reserves of 0 o l d and Unite d 
Sta t e s dollars at an all - time h i •h , Canada is now in an ex -
tr· or dinari l y g ood posi t ion to stabi l ize her currency . arity 
of the Canadian a nd the United States dol l ars woul d pave the 
way for a steady f l ow of true inv es t raent c api t2.l to Canada . 
A spe cula t ive i nf l ux of c ap ital is inf l a tionary and undesir -
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ab l e . A freely f l uctuat ing ex change rat e is part icu l arl y 
susceptible t o s p e culati ve influences, as wi ll be explaine d 
in more detail in the next chap ter of t h is t hesis . 
~hen Canadian exports to the United St ates decline, 
the Canadian dollar wi l l decline . Speculators, ant icipa ting 
further declines , wi l l for c e it d own pr e~ature ly. Th e Ex -
change Control Board wi ll t he n be forced to peg t he dollar 
to halt t he c ap ital ou t f low. Unde r t hese condi tions Canada 
wil l once a ga i n be c onf ronted with the s ame problems she had 
in the earlier postwar period . 
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CHAPT_ R III 
FVALUJI TI ON. OF ,i! Oli~E TARY TF ·oRIES 
A. Fr :_ely Fluctuating Exchang e ~a t e~ 
On September 30 , 1 950, Canada , with her g old and 
A~erican doll ar r e serves a t an al l-t ime high, freed the Ca -
nad ian dollar fro~ the devalued peg on whi ch she b.ad fi x ed 
i t just a year previ ousl y . The a ction was announced by 
F ine.nce !VIinister Dougl a s Abbott, and put an end to ru.-nors 
t ha t the Canadian dollar woul d be restored to parity wi th 
t he United St a tes d ollar . Said t he F inance llinister : 
11 It has been decided not to establi sh any new 
fixed pari t y for the Canadian dollar at this time, nor to 
pres cribe a ny ne w fixed r a tes of exchange . Instead, r a tes 
of exchancs e wi ll b e determined by condi tions of supply and 
de::na.nd for forei gn currencies in Canada . "-::-
Thus Canada re t u r ned t o a system of f reely f l uctu-
at ing exchang e rates, and in the ensuing six ::nonths since 
September the Canadian dollar has taken up a position about 
rnidV'l8.y between its old pe ,sged value and the value of the 
American dollar . The fli gh t of Ameri can money to Canada 
based upon t he spec u l a tion t hat a return to parity v, as i mmi -
nent vva s in t h is way effectivel y stopped , a t l eas t temp o -
rarily. Cana da 's purpo se in ending the inward flow of cur-
rency vva s to insul a te he r own e con omy from tbe j_nflation and 
~~ 36 , D . l 
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rising p rice l eve l in the Unite d St a t es . A l a r ge increase 
in t h e ~oney suppl y in the hands of Canadians would produce 
such an effe ct. It is n ot within t h e scope of the thesis to 
de cide whether, technic a lly , Canada vio l a ted the terms of the 
Internat iona l Wonetary gree~ent. Obviously, t he re t urn to 
f luctuating ex chang e r ates is fruS:rating t he primary objec-
tive of the Interna tiona l Mone t ary Fund , which was to p ro-
v ide and maintein sts.b ilized exchange r a t e s between the mem -
ber nations . 
De v a l u a tion i s provided fo r (Article IV) in case 
of a fundame nt a l d is equilibr i um . The working of the 
Fund is based upon a system of par v a l ues . Every 
money unit is to have an a gre ed gold equival ent, de -
t e r mining t h e pri c e of g old in t he membe r country, 
and t he rates of exchang e be t we en each unit a nd t he 
others. ' Ea ch member undertakes , t hrough appropri-
a tion of appropria te measures , consistent wi t h 
t h is Agreement, to per,1it within its territories 
ex chang e transa c tions between its currenc ies and t he 
currencies of other members only within the limits 
pre scribed, t he limit s being l per cent a.bo ve or 
be low parity . A member whose mone tary authorities 
f or the set tlement of international transac t ions, 
f r ee l y buy and sell g old withi n t he limits pre-
cri be d ••• shall be deeme d to b e fulfilling t his 
und e:t aking . 1 'rhere must a l way s be a definite 
parity, s o any reducti on in the forei gn exchang e 
value of a money unit ~ust be a de terminat e deval u -
a tion, no t a fluctuating deprec i a t ion ~ * 
The ar t ic le quo t ed is referring to the depreciation 
rather t han a ppreciation , but the principles i nvo lve d remain 
the s ame . The following article fro m the same source deal s 
with appreciation of the t ype now under s tudy ~ 
We we r e cons i der i ng the position of a country 
seek ing to dissoci ate itsel f from an inflationary 
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movement of internation al ex tent. It must not only 
adjust rates of exchang e so a s to reduce t he value 
of forei gn money units in terms of its own uni t to 
correspond with t he f a lling wealth v a lue of the f or -
mer; it must a l so i mp ose s u ch measures of dear money 
and credit r es triction as will p r event a mone t ary 
expansion developing from within. 
The pur p ose of t h is procedure is to avoid be-
ing drawn into an exces s ive monetary expansion, an 
enl arge ment of t he flow of money and a rise of the 
p rice l e vel, such a s h ave in the past led to a vi-
ol ently deflati onary corrective, acl are sure to 
d o s o a gain , if a llowe d to occ ur in t h e future. 
But it is clea r beyond d oubt or controversy 
t hat any such p rocess of judi ciously ad justed al-
tera tions of r a t e s of exchang e would be irre con-
c ilabl e with t he Bretton Yv oods p l a n. Even within 
the 10 per cent zone, alterations of pari ty are 
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onl y a llowed i n e s se of 'fundamental disequilibrium.' 
Coul d it be maintained, when a n alteration of l p er 
cent h a s been made on Monday, that a fresh funda-
mental dise quilibrium requires a further l per c ent 
on Tuesday? More t han one alteration of parity may 
reas onably be needed to deal with a g iven fundamen-
tal dise quilibri1;un, but a policy of a ltering rates 
of excha ng e every d ay or two to meet a fresh fun-
d amental dise quilibrium would hardly be consist-
ent with the purpose of Art i cle I (iii) 'to p ro-
mo te exchange s t abi lity .' The plea that it is t he 
one c urrency t ha t is stable, and all t he rest are 
fluctu a ting , would onl y be l istene d to i f the 
Executive Directors of the Fund t h e mselves recog -
n ized wealth-va lue at the criteria of stability. 
I t look s, therefore, as if membership in the 
Bretton Vo ods Int e r na tional ivi onetary Fund would be 
inc onsistent with stability of the wealth-valu e of 
the money unit , unless t h e members of t he Fund t he m-
se lves adopted this aim , and agree1 together u p on 
e f ficacious means of a ttaining it.--~ 
The use of fluctua ting exchange r ates d oes provide 
certain advant ages to the country using that system. Ex -
ch ang e rates c an be l eft to find their own l e vel a nd unrler 
''4 , pp . 47 - 49 
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n ormal conditions fluctuating exchang e rates will tend to 
equilibr ate international payments. Unde r such a system, 
variations in imp orts and expor ts wil l aut omatically r aise 
the price of a forei gn currency which is undervalued and 
vice versa. Adjustments would be made instantaneously a nd 
lang e reserve s of g old or f oreign exchange would not be nec-
essary . Over and under valuations would seem to be a n im-
po s sibility as t here is no problem of artificial controls. 
Despite the advantag es of the system of fluctuat-
ing exchang e r ates , it is r arely reco:nmended . Exchange r a tes 
are prices which are particularly susceptible to speculative 
influences . If t he p rice of forei gn e x chang e has risen and 
is expec ted to rise more, the very anticipa ti on wi ll bring 
ab out its own realization since it wi ll lead to increased 
demand for forei gn exchange. Thus the exchang e rates fluctu-
ating may be se l f-propelling and le a d away from rather than 
towards international payments equilibrium. 
Freely fluctuating exchang e rates burden interna-
tional transactions wi th uncertai n ty and risk, even though 
part of the risk may be a voided by buying and selling 11 for-
ward exchange " for delivery one or t wo months ahead. It is not 
desirable, furthermore, to l et exchange r a tes fluctuate be -
cause of only temp orary chang es in supply and demand . The 
fluctuations woul d cause adjustments in production, that is, 
shifts of l abor from one industry to ano ther which are co s tly, 
and should be av oided if the change is not permanent. Cha nges 
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in exchange r a tes are diff erent fro m oth er p ric e chan ~e s. 
Like c h ange s in the d ome stic purchas ing p ower of money , t hey 
affect a ll prices of internat i onally traded s oods and co n -
c e rn , therefore, the whole econ omy much more tha n c hant;es i n 
i nd ivi dual co:nmodity pric es . 
B . The Pu r chas ing Power Parity The ory 
Th e purchasing p owe r parity theory wa s p opul arized 
by t h e S e dish e conomist -ust a ve Ca ssel, f ollowing the First 
~·i orld 1.ar . It must not be conside red a p ossi b l e pract i c a l 
solution to t he p roblem of exch ange rat e s, but merely as an 
a nalytical t ool. Casse l h imself evaluated the theory as one 
use f u l in e mpha sizing the intera.ction between price levels and 
exchang e rate s and called the theory a 11 simplified approxi-
mation , valuable be caus e it e mphasiz e s in s harp contour-
l ines one s ingle thought which has to be ham:nered as emphat-
ically a s p ossible into the heads of the res p onsible p oliti-
cians and bankers ." 
Pu rchasing p owe r parity, a s the name suggests, 
is the rate wh i ch cou ld be expected to equalize the 
purch asing p ower of the two curr encies ove r commodi -
ties . The p rice l eve l indexes in the t wo countries 
a re used as ~ea s ures of the respec tive purchasing 
p ov•er of the t wo c urrenc ies. On t he assump t i on 
tha t purchasing p ower of the t wo currencies was 
e qu a l ized by t h e exchan ge rate prevai ling in some 
be se ye ar , tha t r a te is a d justed to conform to t h e 
re lative chan ge in t he p rice l evel i ndexes since 
t he b as e year. To il l ustrate, it may be assumed 
tha t t he exchange r a te in the bas e year was 1 4.00 
equals one Bri t ish p ound and t he price l eve l index 
in each country stood at 100 . If, at some later 
da t e, the i nd e x es stood at 150 and 2 00 , r e s p ectively, 
in the two countries , the rate whi ch would equalize 
the p urchasing p ower of the two countries would be 
1 50 divided by 2 00, multipli ed by ·r4. oo or ~~3. co. 
This r a te would constitute purcha sing power parity, 
the hyp othetical norm about whi ch the actual ex~ 
c hange rate would p resumably tend to fluct u at e ." 
Any expe ctation that the computed purch asing 
p ower parity wou ld precisely indicate what exchang e rate 
would es tablish equilibrium would necessarily entail the 
ass~~p tions that: 
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11he t wo currencies were in an equilibrium relationship 
i n the b a se year. 
Index numbers are an accurate measure of chang es in 
purcha sing p ower since the b ase year. 
Com:nodi t y trade dominates the supp ly and d emand of for-
eign exchang e and, therefore, purchasing power over 
g ood s is determina nt of exchange rat e s. 
l\T o chang e in the international ec onomic position of the 
t wo countri e s, such as might r e sult from the erection 
of tariff barriers or a shift from a debtor to a credit -
or p osit ion, has occurred since the base year . 
Since such rigid assump tions a s these are too severe 
to be sust a ined, purchasi n g p ower parity is no long er gener -
ally re g arded as the exact f ocus toward which exchang e rates 
are certain to tend. It has become a somewhat loose point 
of reference, an economic datum to be considered along with 
others in studying t he behavior of exchang e rates under p a-
per standard conditions. 
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The purchasing power parity theory a ssume s that 
change s in t h e forei gn exchang e rate are determined by and 
a r e in p rop ortion to the c h ang es in the relative domestic 
purchasing power of the currencies in question, as expressed 
by the respective price levels. Th is basis as s umpti on cannot 
v a lidly be held for, although there is a correlation -- t h ey 
are not d i re ctly pro p ort ional. Factors other than the rela-
tive domestic purchasing p ower of the respective currencies 
have an in~luence upon e x change rates. 
A hypothet ical illustration of this interaction be-
t ween domestic p rices and exchang e rates under the purchas -
i ng power parity t h eory may be made more clear to the reader 
by the f ollowing : 
As sume prices are about equal in Canada and within 
the United States, in the pe riod just prior to ' vo r ld War II. 
Further assume that during t h e war the p rice level in the 
u. s . A. has doubled whi le that of Canada has remained rela-
tively un changed. The situation presented is such that, 
after the war, Canadians wi ll be unwilling to pay the p re-
war p rice of U. s. A. currency in terms of Canadian money. 
Canadians wil l, however, be induced to purchase American dol-
l a rs if an adjustment is made which compensates for the de-
creased buying power of the American dollar . Theoretically, 
the correct exch ang e ratio in this particular c a se should be 
two to one if we assume that the resp ec ti ve currencies were 
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a t par prior to the war. However, the purchasing p ower 
pari ty theory in drawing this conclusion omits many impor-
tant factors , whic h wil l be briefly summarized. 
Perhaps the most important of the difficulties 
whi ch would be manifested, if an at tempt we re mad e to put 
t he theory into practice, would be the selection of a repre-
sentative l ist of commodities from which the price level in-
dexes could be computed. Unfortunate ly, prices of all g oods 
do not chang e in the same direction and to the s ame de gree. 
Furthermore, an index ~umber is merely an approximation . 
Its inaccuracy makes it an unsatisfactory base for equit able 
exchang e r a t e s. 
An index of Canadian domestic prices of g oods 
which are not interna tionally traded will not necess a rily 
affe ct the exchange r a te in the sane proportion as the do -
mes tic change in the price level. On the other hand, an in-
dex of internationally traded g oods would be valueless be-
cause world market prices are expressed in terms of the ex-
change rate. Relative prices of such g oods in different 
countries a re the re sult of change s in exchang e rates as 
well a s a cause of rate changes. Parities c a lc ulated on 
such an index must always show that the existing exchange 
rates are the true e quil ibrium rate. 
Another factor which should not be overlooked is 
that increased d emand for i mported products will increase 
the d e mand for a f ore i gn c urr ency and wi ll raise t he ex -
c hange r a t e i nd ependently of t he d omes tic price l e ve l . 
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F or the se and other reasons, t oo detailed for a 
pape r of t h i s t ype , t h e purch asing p owe r pari t JT theory can -
not be consi dered a s a p r a cti cal so l ut ion to the fore i ~n e x -
change probl e ~ . Howe ver, it is an int e r es ti n g , ana l ytical 
tool, useful in e v a l uating oth er propos ed so luti ons to t h e 
c urre ncy prob l em. 
C. The Gol d Standard as a n Auto~a tic Sys t e~ 
The g ol d standard , bri ef l y def i ned , is a mone t ary 
system whe r e the uni t of value i n terms of which prices a nd 
~ age s, in addi t i on to deb ts, are custo narily expressed and 
oaid consists of t h e val ue of a fixe d quant ity of gold in a 
l a r g e internationa l mar ke t wh ich is subs t anti a lly fre e. 
The r e a re t h r ee p ossi b l e vari a tions of t h e gold s t andard : 
t he gold -c oin standard, t he s old bullion standard, and t h e 
g ol d exchang e s t and a rd. All of t he se a re true gold stand -
ard s by def inition . 
Ea ch country which was on t he g old s t anda rd had to 
agree to buy and se ll g old a t a fixed pri ce expr esse d in i t s 
own c urren c y . Ea ch mus t a l so a g r ee t h at it woul d n ot i mp os e 
t ariffs or e xport duties t h at wou l d hamper t h e f low of gold . 
The g old s t and a rd operated upon the principle t hat 
g old had its own val ue in internat iona l ~arke t s. Ba l ances 
of tra de were sett l ed by shi pmen t of g ol d . Ind ividua l cou n -
tries in order to r emai n on t he g ol d s t andar d had t o ke ep 
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their price l evel at a point which was deter~ined not by na-
tiona l ~onet ary authorities but a t a l eve l de t ermined by a 
free competitive market. 
The gold standard wa s easi l y understood. Each 
countr y 's monetary unit wa s expressed in terms of a univer-
sal l y known commodity, which had been used for money for 
t h ousands of years . I mp orters and exporters had more f a ith 
i n the me tall ic e;old t han t hey did in thei r own governments . 
It ·was a n int ernational standard and traders quo ted pri ces 
in t erms of g ol d , which wa s f r ee l ; transported be t ween na -
tions. By contrast, manag ed paper currencies tend to be 
s trongl y na t ionali stic . 
The st abil j ty of price l eve l a chieved under the 
g ol d st a ndard is considere d t he system' s Tiost outstanding 
characteristic . Even today, proponents of mana ged paper 
currencies admi t that stability in the general pri ce l eve l 
under t he g ol d st andar<;l was far super i or to any t h ing yet at -
tained by other me thods. In supporting this st~tement, no 
bet ter method cou ld b e used t han to quote t he most vi g orous 
critic of the g old st andar d. In 1 923 Lord Keynes, referring 
to En g l and ' s experience under the g ol d standard, said: 
The remar kab l e feature of t his lone period was 
the relative st bi lity of t h eprice level. Approxi-
ma t e l y the same l evel of p rice ruled in or about 
the years 1826, 1 867, 1871, and 1 915 . Pri ces we re 
a l so l eve l in the yea rs 1 844 to 1 881 and 1914 . If 
we call the index of t he se l atter year s 100 , we 
find t hat for the period of close on a century fr om 
1 826 to t he outbreak of the vra r the maximum fluc tu-
ation in any di rection v•as 30 p oints, t he index 
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never rising ab ove 130 and never f a lling be low 70 . ~:-
Mone t a r y authorities are i n a g r eement t hat t he 
g old st a nd ard ope rat ed with a minimum of huma n intervention 
and was t hu s more or less automa tic. The syst em wa s d epend~ 
a ble be c ause t he re was little manipula tion of currencies by 
the individua l governments which c ould not i m:nedi ate ly be 
measured a nd adjusted for by interna.tional traders. 
The very e ssence of the g old s tand a rd was s t ability 
of exchan g e r a t e s, whi ch re mained fixed i n terms of g ol d . 
t'.djus t :nents , if they were to be made a t all, must necess arily 
b e in oth er v a ri ab l es in th e domes tic economies of the mem-
ber nations . The g old standard v.ras des tined for early di s -
cP.rd when g overnments , inf l uenced by modern theories of full 
employ~ent, began to fi x price s a n d wag es , and instituted 
othe r control s over t he v a ri ab l es. Na tions had h istorical l y 
permitted wa3e and price levels to fluctu a te fr e el y i n t he 
d ome stic e conomy in r espons e to supp l y and d emand, and h a d 
fixed t he exchang e r a t e by adhe rence to t he gold s t and a rd. 
In the t hi rt i e s t h ey r e v er s ed this p olicy by a llowing t he 
ex chang e rat e to v a r y but a rtifici ally fixi ng wa g e and price 
l e vels at home . 
The ar gu..men t t hat t he g ol d s t ndard wa s outmoded 
and cont a ined t he se eds of its own destruction i s bas ed up on 
e vidence which i s inc onc lus ive. ~hi le all countrie s a re 
wi lling to pay for lip service to t h e advancement of inter-
-:<- 2 , p . 1 92 -1 93 
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ne tl on' 1 econo;·1llc c ooper2. t ion , yet l n this fund~:.:nental prob-
le.i1 of f::.::.ci li ta tine: interm·, ti on£,1 trade j t hey choose to pur-
sue policies of econo~ic nat i onali sm . Perhaps the 2 old 
stonda"':'d •Nas a victim of mis,TIEJ:1agement, as is intimated in 
the followins: 
During the years 1 925 - 1931 e, so rt of c;dd 
standard e ap~eared; rather a corpse of its for~er 
se l f for its fundamenta l spirit --the life of 
laiss ez - faire v.ss locl:in<;S. ?;x c ho.n,;e T'ates v·ere 
indeed stabi liz ed , for ~one t ary authorities bou~ht 
and sold g old at fixed pri c es. They thus to ok 
steps to be on the ~old standard; but they se l dom 
took the necessary step s to stay on the go l d stand-
~rd. 3o far fro~ ensurinb t~a t expansions and con-
tractions of money and credit followed upon 0 0ld 
:nove :·r..ents, ::nd that trade adjustmen ts follov'ed in 
their turn, ;over-n:nen ts pursued wha t ever ~ olicies 
see:·ned to pro.note L:1.:n.ediate na t ional int e2ests . 
TLey interfered ~ lth the expans ions and contra c -
tions of money end credit , t hey regulated mcrkets 
and price s; in sener a l, t ey exhi bited the rise of 
ec ono~ic nationalis~ and the de cline of l aissez -
Jl r.: ire. ·~~ 
'flhe fa;nous Swedish e cono:nist, Gustav Casse l, said 
in part in exp l ainin3 the breakdown of the g old standard: 
It re112.ins to exp l 8 in why the h u se .sccumul a-
tion of g old in Fran ce and the Uni t ed States did 
not produce an increas e in the effe ct ive means of 
~ ay.nent, and t he r e f or e a rise in internal prices 
in the receiving countries . Ho~ever, both 
in France and the Uni t ed States , there was en a ver-
sion for using the fresh Go l d acquired for any 
such purpos e end to a l ar~e extent t he ~bld was 
E>blp l y bur ied in t he vaults of the Central Banks . 
l s a consequence of a restrictive credit pol i cy, 
the nri c e l eve l s of t hese countrie s vere not only 
p reve n t ed from r-isin;~ but a ctually lowered in 
spite of tho continued flow of ;;old . 
The fact that the g ol d - receiving countries 
failed to use their increasing z old reserves for 
ex tendi nG the effective supply of ~eans of payment 
~ust be regarded as abnormal and, t herefore, as an 
independent c nus e of the fall in p r ices e t the side 
of the maldistribution of ~old itself. Had the 
g old been used in a nor~al way , p rices in France 
and the United States would have risen above the 
pri ce level of the outside world. This woul d have 
l ed to a n exp ort of g old which woul d have saved the 
outside wor l d from further fall in p rices and 
.he lped it to ~na.int ain the g old standard . Thus it 
may truly be s aid that the breakdown of the f~ O l d 
st andard wa s the result of a flagrant mis~anage ­
~ent of this ~onetary mechanism . 
The pay.nent of war debts in conjunction ,vi th 
the unwi llingness to r e ceive payment in the n ormal 
for :n of g oods l ed to unreasonable demands on the 
world's Aonet ary g old stocks; and the claimants 
f a iled to use in a proper way the s o l d that they 
he.d accumulate d . This statement may serve as a 
conclusion of our examination of t he essential 
c auses of the extra.ordinary fall in commodity 
prices s:i.nce the middl e of 1 929 and of the follovv-
in,_?; collapse of t h e g old standard. -::-
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The i :npractic&>.lity of trying to e v a l uate the merits 
of the g old standard through the study of the present inte r -
national monetary system is clearly shown in this quotation, 
which i mp l icit ly denies that the United St ates or any ether 
country is today on the g old standard. 
The international gold s tandard has now for B 
nu!nber of years ceased to exist and no useful c on-
clus ions concerninG its merit s of defects can be 
drawn ei ther from ~merica 1 s present peculiar na-
tionalistic, administrative g old bullion standard 
or from the pegged and unpegged manage d paper 
standard s existing e lsewhe re in the world. ** 
·,....------- ---;~ 14' ~)p . 71-72 
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Gold is s t i l l used to sett l e internatio na l bal-
an~es and p l ays en i~portant ro l e in the Int ernationa l ~one ­
ta r y Fund . As a standard of val ue , it _ills no c ompe t itors. 
It is the bes t !11a t e ri a l for use a s e :-:1one t a ry s t ande.rd be -
C f:'. use of its uni ver s s.l ceeptabili t y , its physical cha r &.c ter -
isti cs, a nd its stability . 
Many e c ono!11ists , bankers, end bus ine ss!11en fe vor a 
re turn to the ;ol d s t andard ard to the free enterprise sys -
t e :1. It is particul arly p opu l a r with t hose who save and in-
vest in nr oduct ive ent e r prise . Thi s t yp e of thinkinJ is be -
co~in3 ~ore preval ent as peopl e reali ze t he futi l i t y of sav -
ins by purchas i ng ~ overn~ent b onds , which d e preci a te with 
each suc c eeding year. A re li abl e s tore of v a l ue i s becomi n~ 
increasingly a tt ractive . 
Tho se who h old the opp osite view are feerful t hat 
a return to t he ;;ol d s t andard wo u l d restrict .2: overrunent bor-
rowing and c; overnrnent spen d i ng , which, in turn , would cause 
unemploy~ent and depres s ion . In general, they f a vor a man-
a g ed oaper curre ncy, ~hi ch will orovi de s ome e l as t ici t y in 
t~e !11oney supp l y and credit . 
~ . Currencv Depr eciation a s a Cure f or Econo!11ic I lls 
"rrhe ter~ 1 exchan g e contro l 1 i s so:ne t i mes e :np loyed 
t o des cribe any .s; overnnental p olicy des i gned to influe nc e ex -
cha n ge ra t es . It is usually appli e d, h owever, to ad!ni n istra -
tive c ontrol of t he d e !nan d f or, an d s upp l y of, fo r ei gn exchang e 
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11 coup led with maintenance of' an officially established r e, te 
for the domestie :.none t a ry unit. n-::-
'.Jhen a particul ar curre.ncy is valued in terms 
of' forei gn currencies, a t a rate v'<hi ch is above t h e 
equilibrium level, there is ~ te ndency for exports 
to be re t arded and i .nports sti:nula.t e d, and other 
streins and stresses to result. i hen, on the other 
hand, a currency is u nderv e. lued in f oreig n ma:ri{:e ts 
re lative to its purchasing power a t home, exports 
are stimul a ted, i mp orts retarded, and g old t end s 
to flow in . Either situation is e conomically ab -
normal and undesirable, but in the li s ht of mercan-
tilistic sentiment in favor of exports and a gainst 
imports, the second situati on is not only ge ner-
a lly preferred to the first but may appear a ttr a c-
tive, particularly in times of' depression and un-
employ:.nent , as a maj or objective of n a tional policy . * * 
FlD:n the above quotations , we may formulate a fairly 
comprehensive concep t of' the meaning of' currency depreciation . 
The t wo ~ost imo ortant characteristics of any currency de-
1Jreciation are: 
l . An exchang e ra t e ~hich is artificially con-
trolled by the g overnment . 
2 . The domestic monetary unit is undervalued on 
forei gn ~arke ts in relation to its purchasing 
· oVler at home. 
Only since 1933 have g overnments voluntarily de-
precinted their currencies. Prior to that time, currency 
depre ciation occurred but it was the direct result of' the 
forces of supply and demand for foreign exchange in the open 
market betwe en buyers and sell ers . In 1933 g overn:..enents be g an 
"n" l2, T) . 641 
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u sing a rtificial l y ~aint a i ned exchang e r a t e s in a desperate 
a ttemp t to combat def l ation and unemp l oyment . Th e theories 
of Lord ICeyne s were popul a. r , and a.--n ong his be.si c pre cepts 
wa s t he idea t h at a man a g ed paper currency could be ut il ized 
i n ~aint aining fu l l emp l oy'Tient. In t h e t h ir t ies Canada, as 
well a s mP.ny other countries (Br i t ain , F r ance , ·us tra li , 
Sweden) res orted to currency depre c iati on . The effects of 
these exp erimen ts we re v aried but the p r act ice wa~ more 
profi t able i n t he early p a rt of this e r a . Re talitory cur -
rency depr ecia tion neutra l i zed t he effects in t he l a t e r 
years . 
e.t ion are: 
The most c ommon r e a s ons f or us ing currency depre c i -
l. The nat ion concerned is c a lled upon to make 
forei gn payments so far in excess of its f or-
eign r e ceipts t ha t it vir tua lly exhausts t h e 
suppl y of g old a nd forei gn ba l anc es which h a ve 
been used to rest rict osci ll a tions of exchang e 
r a tes to a desi r ed rang e . 
2 . Inf l ation . If there has b een a rise in t he 
general pri c e l eve l, t h en export s wi ll d e cl ine 
and i mp orts will increase. If t he country 
concerned we re Canada , then Canadian dollar 
ex chan g e woul d fa ll abro ad and forei gn exchan g e 
would rise in Canada . 
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3 . The fore i gn mar k et for a c ountry ' s ex p ort c on-
tra cts or t h e vo l u.'Tle is maintained, but t he ir 
v al ue f a lls drastic ally . 
4 . Fore i gn Indeb t e dness. Re c eipts fr cm ab roa d may 
p rovide insufficient forei gn exchang e to permit 
payment of p rincipal and int erest. 
There are a number of very p ractic a l a dv ant ages to 
t h e use of c u r r ency depreciation . Among these are the fo l low-
ing : 
1. Exports are pl a ced in a better competitive p o-
sition i n t h e worl d mark et . This means more 
empl oyment in export industries and t h e na -
tional income wi ll increase. 
2. I mports can be curt a iled by t h is means, thus 
facilit a ting do:ne stic 11 refla tiona ry" measu r e s 
undertak en by the g overnment to fi gh t depres-
sion . 
3 . A country ' s e conomy c a n b e insul a ted fro~ d e -
p ressions in other c ountries to a certain de -
gr e e . 
4. Pr es sure s roup s desiri ng inflation can us e de -
preci a tion of currency a s a me a ns to a ttain 
t hat g oa l. 
Despite thes e advantag es of currency d ep r e ci a tion 
wh ich i n sure s it a pla c e in f uture internationa l mone tary 
olicies on a wor l d - wi d e b a sis, t h e purp ose of this t h esis 
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is to show that t h e disadv a ntage s far outweigh the advan-
tag es when it is employedretween economies like those of Ca -
nada and t he United States. These fundamental disadvantag es 
are: 
l. Frequent chang es in exchange rates impede and 
strang le forei gn trade. 
2. The threat of currency depreciation discour-
ages international investment. 
3 . Currency depreciation invites reta l iat i on by 
other countries, and such retaliation neutral -
izes the d e preciation. 
4 . The ter:ns of trade are turned a ge-ins t t h e ne- -
tion using curr ency depreciation. A le-rger 
quantity of g oods will have to be expor t ed to 
acquire t h e same volume of i mp orts . 
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C~-li.PT 'H IV 
I t the conference at Bretton ~ oods 8 set of reco~­
~endstions wa s sub~itted to the me~bers . The parti cipating 
Jovern~ents ~ er e urg ed to: 
l. ~educe obstacles to international trade a n d in 
other ways pro.no te mutually advan tet,e ous inter-
national co .. :ne r•ci2.l rels.tions . 
2 . Brin · about t h e orderly ~arketing of staple 
co.nmodi ties at prices f&ir to producers and 
cons umers 2.lik e. 
3 . Deal wi th the spe ci e l prob l e~s of internationa l 
concern which ·will a ris e fro . ! the c essation of 
roduc tion for w2.r purposes. 
4. F'a. cili t ate by cooperRtive e ffort t . e har.loni -
zc.tion of national policies of .11e·nber stat e s de-
si :;ned to pro.:1ote and maintain hi gh levels of 
emp loyment and p rogressively bring ~b out risins 
st ndards of l iving . 
The brie f su~,rrn ary of the f~rticles of .. c; r eenent , 
Vi .. l.ich fol lows, is not intended to t;i ve the reader a c ompre -
~.lens ive vie w of t h e o b jectives of tne J.nt e r national . .lonetary 
Fund . It includes only the .igh liGhts which are pertinent 
to the present thesis. 
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The -oar value of the currency of each member shal l 
be expressed in terms of ~o l d or the 1Jni ted States dollar . 
The ~und sha l l 9rescribe a mar g in eb ove and be l ow par val ue 
for transaction in gol d by members , and no ~ember shall buy 
~old at 2 p rice abov e par val ue p l us t he p r e scribed nar g in, 
or sell ~o l d below pal' v2lue , minus the p rescri b ed margin . 
h ovrever, in c c..ses of a fundamental disequi l ibr iu.n , t he Fund 
may concur in a proposed chan~ e in these spe c ifications . 
If a me :nber changes t he par val ue of i ts currency 
wi thout the pe r-nission of t he F'und , then the :!lembe r wi ll be 
ine li .;ible to use t tl.e resources of the F und . 
The use of the Fund ' s resourc es for c apital tr ~ns ­
fers is to be restricted . A tnembe r may n o t use t he F'und 1 s 
resources to :nee t a l a r be or sust8ined out f low of c i t a l. 
The Fund ay re aues t member t o exercis e cont ro l s to pre-
vent such use of the resources of t he Fund . .Liowever, its 
resources ~ -Y be used in reasoneble a .n ounts when necessary 
for the expansion or maintenance of the present vo l ume of 
trade . ~enbers mey exercise control s when neces sary to reJu-
L;~ te international c::tpitol :nove ~r1e nts, but not in 1:1. nanne r 
which wi ll restrict payments for current transactions , or 
which wi ll de l ay transfers of fun6 s in settlement of comnit-
:nent s . 
The max L num 9.nd minimum rates for excha11f:e t r ans-
a ctions between the currencies of membe rs , t ak ing p l ace 
within t~eir territories shall not d iffer fr om parity more 
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than l pe r cent in sp ot transactions, or in t he c ase of 
other eYchanse transactions by more than ~hat the Fund dee,ns 
reasor..able . 
Ea ch .1e. ber undertakes to collaborate v: i th the 
Wu 1~ to pro~ote exchange stability, to ma intain orderly ex -
cnange 8rran0 ements with other members, and to avoid co~­
neti tive exchan e 2lteratio ns . :;:; ach member must avoid dis -
criminatory currency practices . 
A nember ~ay chans e its currency ' s par v lue only 
af ter consultation ~ ith t1e Fund . Permission will b e s r nted 
by the ?und onl y if 
rium is necessary . 
correction of a funda-cnental dis equilib-
The Fund is not intended to provide facilities for 
relief or reconstruction, or to de l with internationa l in-
d ebtedness arising out of the w&r. The pos t war transitioral 
period wi ll re'1uirc:; changes and ad ·us t : .ents. In meldnr de -
cisions in regard to such a djustments , t he Fund ill 6 ive 
the . e :nber the benefi t of any reasonable doubt . -:~ 
The pr i mary objective of t he lnternational .~wnet "ry 
Fund is the :9romotion of ex change ste.bility . 'rhe use of cur -
rency d epreciation i s discourat;ed as a means of atte.ining 
co~petitive adv· ntag e in international trad e . The Fund also 
undert a~e s to restore ~n international trading syste~ ba sed 
u:oon z old values for ee ch 'nember ' s c urrency . Such VB l ues e re 
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to be ~edified onl y ~hen ne cessary to correct funda me ntal 
eli sequi l i bri um in int ermJ tional b a l 2nces of ~ ey~nent. Inter-
na tiona l trarle is to be fostered by oool of gold end stand -
e rd ~oney s . This p ool of mo ney s is to be used only whe n for -
ei ; n e xchan~e r e sources in private b8nkin,; c nannels e.re ex-
hausted. 
In order to sup ~lement t he Fund , t h e International 
Eank for : econs truction nd Deve lopnent was org ani zed . Its 
purn os e is to provide cap it a l for investment in p roductive 
projects contributing to the reconstruction nd deve lopmen t 
of .ne'nb er nations. It i s a l so intended to stimulate int er-
national trade b: me ans of int ernati onal loans . 
The basic pr incipl e of t he Fund is simpl e . Ea ch 
membe r country must provid e to t he Fund e n a s si0ned su_ made 
up of its own currency and c old . The _< und s t a rt s l ife with 
&bout 8 . 5 bi l li on dolla r s of go l d and money of al l k inds. 
hen a membe r country find s t hat it c~nnot a c quire fore i 3n 
uoney on t b.e ordinary for ei ~~n exc han ge mar ke t, it m~:ty ;set it 
_ro'n the Fund , p ay i ng for it i n its o wn . on ey , t hough t h is 
ri gh t is sub ject to defi nite l imi t ations . Thus ,if a coun-
try ~ants more f ore ign c urrenc y a t exist i n ; exchang e rates 
t hen forei bn c ount ries ore wi l ling t1 supp l y , it can call on 
t he F und f or the diffe re nce . It is no t forced to r a tion an 
insufficient s tock of f orei gn cur renc y nor to ad op t def l a -
tionary meas ures nor final l y to mark d own the p rice of its 
money i ~ te rms of forei ~n money. Y us t : e Fund offe rs 
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f a cili t ies to countries th~ t are te~p or ari ly short of for-
ei gn exchan~e , and by so doing re~oves from them the incen-
tive to a d op t ei t her def l ationary or other measures whi c h 
woul d injure other countries. The he l is off e r ed on a loan 
basis, a nd t h e r a te of int erest rises i th t ~e s i ze of t e 
lo an a nd the l ength of t i me for whic h it is :Tiade. '~ 
All coun t ries unders t a.nd the ad v an t ages of exchan6 e 
s t a bi l ity , but that doe s no t me a n t hat t hey wi ll be wi lling 
to s a crifi c e prosp eri t y in orde r to ma int a in these advan-
t ages . Since the early 1 930 ' s s overnments have been increas -
inz currency control s , sincerely be l ievins t hat they ay ward 
of f domestic business depre s sio ns by this method . There h a s 
been no severe test in recen t y e ars which co u l d b e used to 
te s t t h e effi c a c y of these controls. The Interna tional ~one-
tary Fund was establi shed b ecause eve n t he countries com:nit -
t ed t o curre n c y d e pre ciation in def l a t i ona r y peri ods realized 
t h at onl y chaos woul d r esult if nat i on a li s tic exchans e rate 
control s we r e pursued i ndefi nitely . Substitution of inter -
nationa l c on trols may be t he an s wer, but it i s doubtful t h at 
the Fund as it exists today could cope with the proble~s 
wh ich ~ ould surely a rise during a world-wi d e depres s ion . 
B. ~ ss enti a l ~ eaknesses of the I nternational 
!!ione t a..£1: Fun d Provisions 
In cri tiel zing t h e Intern8.t ional Mone t a r y Fund, the 
~ ·- 1 7 ' p . 6 1 8 
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wri t e r d oe s n ot intend to i~ply t ha t t h e Fund will n o t be 
effective in t he long r un . Th e Fund is in the first s tage s 
of lt s development a nd r epre s ents a r a dic a l d ep a rture f rom 
h i s t or i c a l i n terna tional monet a ry p ol i cy. It i s def ini tely 
a s tep in t he ri eht dire ction , but t _e ori 0 inal Agr e eme nt 
will appear p r imi tive in retrospe ct f ifty y ears from n ow . 
In order to a ch ieve agre ement amongst t he fort y -
four s i g n a tory n a tions of v a r y ins e conomic asp ira tions, the 
Art i cl e s of Agr e ement had to be very broa d, v e ry e l as tic i n 
t he ir p r 'Jv i s ions , and i mp ose n o str i ct obligations whi ch 
mi gh t s e rve to discourage nations from becoming sig n a tories. 
The Agr eement ha s, t h ere fore , included exceptions, qu a lifi-
ca t i on s, and esc ap e claus es which ~;r eatly diminish t h e 
chance s of a tt a ining t h e ob jectives of the Fund i n t h e near 
fu t u r e . 
During t h e f i rst ye a rs of transition t h e exchan g e 
~arke t wi ll b e bur d e ned by indebt e dne s s a rising from 
t h e war and p articu l arly by block ed b a l a nces . These 
and m~ ny othe r comp l ications lie outside t h e s c ope 
of t he proj e cte d I nterna t i ona l Monet a r y Fund . A 
ma jor criticism of the Fund, t h erefore, is t h a t 
ei t her it will p rov e inad e qua te to deal with t hese 
qu es tion s, or it will be come a c a tch of n atchwork 
~olici e s . The draft art i cle ~ of the Fund A .r e e me nt 
commit t h e si gn a tories to t h e p rincipl e t ha t exchang e 
control s hal l b e a bo l ished; but t hB use of exchan g e 
control is to cont i nue for the interim period of 
transition. The Fund , t h erefore, is intended as an 
i nstrument of consult a tion and :nutual support by t h e 
he lp of which member - countries may restore both tr ade 
and exchang e de a ling s, a s well as capit a l trans a c -
tions, to private initi a tive in a fr e e end multi l at -
eral marke t . 
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Accord in~ to this quotation the draf t a rticles of 
t h e Fund commit the si natories to t he principle t h at ex -
chang e control sha ll be aboli s hed . Other than si gning t he 
Ag r e ement , t h ere h as be en no indic a tion that the s i gnatories 
wi ll in nra ctice be a ny more willing to a ccept domestic de -
fl a tion in order to l ive up to the spiri t of the As r e ement 
t han t h ey were willing to re~ain on the g ol d standard under 
t he same conditions. We must not forget that the League of 
Nation s, like the Monet a ry Fund , was a n international a gree -
me nt. Its noble ob jectives were a b andoned when the si gn a -
tory na tions reali zed the sacrifices they must bear in car-
r y ing out t heir obliga tions under the a greement. 
It is t h e contention of this thesis tha t a s upple-
ment ar y :none t a ry a 6 r e e ment between the United States a nd 
Canada c· n b e reach ed which, while more limited in its ob -
j e ctives, wil l b e :n.ore e f f icacious in bringing about exchang e 
stab ility be t ween the t wo countries. The object ives of t he 
s u p p l e .. entary agre ement would be simi l ar to those of t h e 
und . It i s felt that it vv ould be a much simpler p roblem to 
a tt a in exch an ge st abi lity betwen t wo countries which are eco-
n omi c lly nd i deolog ic ally simi l ar t han it is to attain t h e 
same ob jectives on a world-wide ba s i s. Th e suup l e mentary 
a z ree:ne nt can be more s pecific tha n the Fund an d wil l not 
have to deal with t h e ma ny vari ab les invo l ved in t h e bro a d e r 
inte rnationa l p icture. 
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The Article s of Agree 11ent a re expressed in such 
general t e r ms t h at it see~s doubtful t ha t the signatory na -
tions all underst ood t h e meaning of t h ose Article s in exact l y 
t he same way. That t his is t rue is obvious to any r eader who 
t ak es the troub l e to study the v a ri ous interpre t at ions of 
such phras es as 11 transitiona l p eriod" nd "fundamental dis -
equilibriu!TI . 11 In a book l e t dis tributed by the Boc.rd of Gov -
e rnors of t he F ederal Hese rve System, rt obert Triffiri~ expl a ins 
in l eng th jus t what is meant b :y the l at t er term. Then in the 
s e.r.1e _ ub lic ation Gottfri e d Ha berler, in reformul a ting t he 
defi nit ion of t he t er~ , begins es f ollows: 
I s hall now try bri e f ly to reformul ~t e some 
i ·n-·J l ic&.tions of de fini n; ' d isequi li bri um ' in t er'lls 
of be lan ce of p ay~ nts ' de ficits and discus s a f ew 
ary arent and cenuine exc~pt i ons to this r u l e . 
• ha t is said in t h e fo llowins oages see~s t o 
ne in S1' .J stanti 1 a6r ee --:1en t v; ith Dr. Tr iffin ' s t e n -
t a tive definit ion of ' fundc .. nente l disequilibriu:n ' 
as a a l ad just~e nt in B country ' s e conomy so ~rave 
and uersis t ent t h a t t i e restor a ti on or maintenance 
of s ,_;_ ti sfactory l eve l s of domes t i c ,ct ivi ty, employ -
:nent, end incomes woul d prov e i nco:np .ti b l e 1Hith 
E.(Jui librium in the balanc e of payments, if no t a c -
co:npani ed by ex tra ord ina r y measures of exte r na l de -
fense , s uch a s a chan;e in the e xchange rates , in-
creased t ari f f or exchange control protection , etc . 
This Dee~s to me a ~os t i n s enious formul tion 
vvl:i c h c ontains, in &. n l.l.t s 1ell, vll impor t an t e l e -
ments of t h e probl en . ** 
e r ha p s t h e si~natory n a tions thorou~hly under -
sto -:> d t :e .neanin6 of '~ funda~nent a. l disequili b rium, 11 perl~aps 
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t hey even were in comp l ete e~ree~ent on wha t const"tut e s a 
s a tisf a ctory l e vel of do~es tlc a ctivity, e~ployme nt, and ln-
c~ es . However, it is more p robable that Article V is ren-
de r ed 'neanin.; l es s by the amb i g u i ty of the t e rm 11 funda.: nenta l 
diseg_uilib riun . 11 .rticle I if specif icall y states tha t t he 
Fund will n ot &r a nt p erni s si on to alter exchan ge r ate s more 
t h an 10 per cent unl e ss a nfun damental disequilibri um 11 ex-
i s t s . Yet t h ere i n o u n ani mity of opinion on t he ·. eBning 
of t h at te_" :-1. , 
The a-oplicant need not be d is c oura~ed if the li'und 
de cide s t h at n o fundame nt a l disequilibrium exists in his par -
tic u l ar case , a nd t hat a r a ltera t ion of parity ~re ter t h a n 
1 0 per cent is unwarrE·.n t e d . !mother a.nd much l a r 3er l oop-
h ol e is op en to t he woul d - b e depr e ciating na tion . Lrticle 
IV g oe s on to state '' t he p rivile ge of a lt e rin; t he exchan ;::; e 
r a te s. a l l no t be r efused on t h e ~rounds of domesti c, sociel, 
or p olitical p olicie s of the 8.pplic a nt nation . 11 He r e indeed 
is an opportuni ty for wholesale abuse of the Fund, or for ib-
norin T i ts purp ose entire ly. 
A ch ange in pari ties, according to t he Fund, re -
aui r e s the cons ent of every conntry wh ich has 1 0 per c ent or 
more of t h e tota.l quotas. This me ans tha t t he United St a tes 
and t h e United King dom must agree on the proposed chang e. As 
b oth are ; old producers , t hey will be i nc lined to f avor ke e n -
ing t he price of g old a t a h i gh l e vel . F ro!n history we have 
no indication t h at the se t~o n a t ions wi l l ac t unanimous l y in 
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a z:, r E: ve e conomic crisis . It is improbabl e that they vi ll 
ever 2ct to ~e the r to re duce t he p rice of g old althous h t h ey 
~i ght a gree to r ai se t he price . In effect t h e new interna-
tiona l ~onet ary syst e m is based on g ol d as a standard of 
value. I f t h e price of ~ old cannot be reduced in times of 
~one tary crisis, t h en depression may be t he only al ternative 
for so'Tle of t h e :ne:nbers. The Fund is b a sed upon g old for 
settle11ent of interna tional ba l a nces. 'rhe source of exchang e 
stabil ity under t he F und is g old. ~xchan ge sta bi lity ~ained 
by peg3"ng the price of ~old will l ead to the s ane deflation-
a r y t e ndencies of the LOld standard. 
Article I in t he charter of the Fund states that 
one of t he ob5ectives is " to correct mal adjustments in the ir 
bal a nc e s of pay:nent • 11 The Fund can only correct ma l adjust -
ments direct l y tra ceab l e to unde r or ove rva l ued monetary 
units . There are other f ~ctors which cause unfavor able tra de 
ba l a nces \':hi ch cannot be corre s ted b y me re l y altering the e x -
chane;e r ate . 
The Fund p e r mits a member to maintain exchange con-
trols on current transactions f or a l imited p ostwar period 
a n d p rovides for an ex tension of t he so-called transitiona l 
oeriod . ~any countries have e lready been obli ge d to t ake 
B.d vant age of this privi lege . 'rhus countri e s tak ing advantag e 
of the excep tions outnumbe r those adhe r ing to t h e rules at 
t he very outset . Prohibi tion of exchange contro l s under the 
Fund 8ppears to be an ide a l which ~ay never be rea l ized . 
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Enforcement of the off icial decisiom of the Fund 
will b e i ~practical, and in a period of economic crisis mem-
bers will withdraw, as is indicated in the following quota-
tion: 
A conspicuous example of the Fund's failure to 
enforc e its views on a ~ember nation is t h e case of 
the devaluation of t h e F rench fran c, undertaken on 
J a nuary 26, 1948 . This devaluation established a 
multiple currency s y stem, in that it i nvolved b oth 
an officia l exchange r ate as well as a free market 
rate for c ertain transactions in Unite d States dol -
l a rs a.nd Portuguese escudos. The Fund voiced strong 
objections, not to t h e principal of devaluation, 
but to the use of a mult i p le rate in its accomplish -
ment. In the final outcome, France remained a mem-
ber of t he .B'und , and hs.s u nde rtaken to use the mul-
tiple currency device only as a temporary measure. 
F rom the Fund 's standpoint, however, there is a t 
p r e sent no 1 agreed 1 par value for the F'rench franc; 
and France is, for t he time being , denied further 
a cc es s to t h e Fund ' s r es ources. Thus while France's 
independence of action ha s been not without penalty , 
t he outcome can hardly be said to have enhanced the 
Fund's pre sti g e . * 
Th ere have b e en a number of indications in t he 
shor t existence of the Fund that nations will a.g ree to the 
principles of t he Fund, a.nd then seek to pursue a ne.tional 
p olicy designe d to circumvent the agreements made under the 
Fund . •rw o examples will be pres e nted here and will suffice 
to bring out t he p oint. 
1. Canada- - The Fund s pecifical ly e mphasizes t h at 
members should discourage transactions in g old 
above t he parity orice . Yet Canada seeking to 
r ai se t he domes tic vol ume of e;old production 
-::-5 ; pp .110-~-
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by a subsidy to miners circu.'1lvented the offi -
ci a l views of the Fund by a roundabout subsidy 
b ased upon production c ost s of individual ~ines . 
2 . Britain-- The Bretton 1noods ' p l an s pecifically 
proh i b its any res tri ct ions up on pa~ents for 
int e rna tiona l tran s ac tions and d isc r i~inat ory 
currency practices. But Brit a in has perpetu-
a ted a system which app e ar s to violate bo t h of 
t hese prohibited a cts . Under a Payments A5ree-
ment, members of t he United Ki n s dom wh o export 
to Gr eEtt Brit a in ~nust s pend the proc e eds on l y 
up on imp ort s from Great Brit a in. In t his \'ay , 
~ember s of t he United Kingdom have a l ar s e par t 
of t he ir export i ng p ower e liminated from the 
bal ance of payments wi t h the wor l d outs i de t he 
British Emp ire. To a vo id an a dverse ba l ance 
of trade , t hese countries either r es trict i~­
p orts fr oill t he outside worl d or acc e p t a lowe r 
forei g n e x change v a l ue for t heir mone t ar y units . 
To avoid unde sirable re sults fro~ t he l a tter 
course , i mp orts from Great Brit ain ~nu st re c eive 
p r e f e r ential treatment , whi ch is in viol a tion 
of the a gre ements with t he Fund . 
The Fund make s n o p r ovisi ons to cont rol t he unof -
fi ci a l ~arket in f or e i gn exchange. Control of t he offici a l 
market wi t hout control of t he unoffici a l mar ke t wou l d b e 
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ineffe ctive . If rest r i ctions i~posed by int e r nat ional azree-
11ent crea te an unrealistic forei gn exchange r8te, investors 
and treders wi ll resort to t h e unoff ici a l ~arket of their ovn 
making . 
C. Canad and t h e United States under t he Fund 
In 1943 propos a ls for monetary stab iliz a tion 
we re a.ctively under revi ew . 'rhe British had pre -
o ared a p lan for inte rna tiona l cooperation known 
as t he Keynes Plan. Comparable proposals by the 
United St a t es were k nown as t he White Pl a n . Up on 
examina tion of these t wo p ropo sals, t hey we re found 
to be far apart. They differed in so many respects 
t ha t grave fears were exp r essed a s to whether com-
~on ground coul d be found. This prospect so dis-
turbed Canadian offi ci 8l s t hat in t h e s um .. _er of 
1 943 t h ey p r epared and published an official but 
anony~ous pl an c a lled t h e Canadian Draft Propo s a ls. 
These prop osals aimed de l iberately to b rid ge t h e 
;;ap between t he ~~ hit e and t he Keyne s Pl a ns . Later, 
in Jul y 1 944 , re p r e sentatives of for t y - four nations 
me t to discuss these mat ters a t Bretton ~ oods, New 
Hampshire . I n t h e final p l an which emerged, sev-
e ral of the main prop os a ls follo wed t h e compromise 
p ropositions sugz ested b y Canadian experts . * 
Canada wa s p a rtic u l arl y we ll equipped to serve a s 
med iator between t he t wo major sponsors of the Fund . Canada ' s 
trade is multilate ral in n a ture, an d t h e bul k of her tr nsac -
tions form a tri angular oattern between t h e United Kin; d om 
and t he United St a tes. As Canada is to such a g r ea t extent 
d enendent upon forei gn trade for her economic well -bein~ , s h e 
·as vi t a lly interested i n t he succ es s of t h e propose d Mane-
tary Agr e ement . An interest ing featur e of t~e compromise 
-::-5 ' p. 7 
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nr oposal s wa s t hei r si ~i l arity to the origina l American pl n 
r a t he r t h an to the Keynes Pl an . 
Ea c h member n a tion a g re ed to contribute a certain 
quot a mad e up of its own currency and g old . It is unneces-
sary to dwell on t he technical de t a ils of the quota system . 
It wi ll suff ice to r e veal that t he total capital contri buted 
was bout 2 , 000 , 000,000 dollars, and the respective shares 
contributed by t he countries i n which we are interes t ed wer e 
as follows : Canada, 300 , 000, 000 d ollars; United t ingdo~, 
1, 3 00 , 000 , 000 d ollars; and t he United ~ t ates, 2 ,750, 000,00 0 
doll ars. 
Canada i s one of t he world ' s l eading GOld produc-
e rs, a nd as such she is in a position to profit ma teri lly 
fro~ an Inter national Monet a ry F und whi c h functions success-
fully . F or, as was p revi ously po i nte d out, t he F und will 
tend to maintain t he p rice of t old a t its p r e sen t l eve l or 
higher be c ause it i s d ominated by g old - p roducing nat i ons. 
The Fund a l s o assures a steady demand f or old by p roviding 
for t he settlement of int e rna tiona l balances in that me tal. 
However, t h e subsidy to Cana d i an mi n e rs is a viol a tion of 
the s p irit of the Bretton Vi.r; od s ' 2. 0reement. 
In every case in which the Canad i an exchang e rate 
has been E.lt ered since t he we.r, it has b een done only af ter 
c onsulta ti on with t he .Lnt e r' m ·. t ional ll'i one tary Fund . Yet t h e 
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s tudy of Canada ' s record wi t hin recent years does not indicate 
t hat t h e Fund wi ll be effective in attainins its obj e cti~es. 
The record of the nited States h s been equally unimpressiv6. 
In 1 : 44 t he United St ates Tre&sury persuaded 
forty odd other nations to set up t he Int ernational 
:'r'lonetary Fun d as t he guard i an of stabl e money val-
ues . 
J!._ L l10st three vears 2go, by sanctioning J.•l . 
hayer' s :nul tipl e r~bber francs in France , the 'rreas -
ury shot its shaft into the Fund . LaQt year, in 
dr vin::~: for sterling devaluation , it a s;ai n by- passed 
the :?und . Cana.da 1 s unpe gging of the dol l ar may 
suell t h e org anization ' s demise . 
t. ha tever t he ul ti;na te fs te of the Int e~ national 
~onetary Fund, however , Canada ~ad no choice once 
t he United S t a tes proved unable to stabi lize tts dol-
lar. Par a lyzed by the auarre l bet1 een the F ederal 
e serve and t '1e 'Treasur· J , :~ a shine::, ton has f ai l ed to 
measur e up to i ts responsi b ility as the ~orld's fi -
nancia l c apital . Canada h d either to ~cc ep t an in -
f lation not of its own making (and possibl y of short 
dur gt ion) or rvoid it b y unorthod ox means . 
Given the unpredictability of 'r. ashin:;ton a cti on , 
its a uthorities concluded that a fixed exchang e rate 
between the t wo North A:nerican dollars had be co:ne e 
har mfu l l uxury. ·~.hen the Federal re serve resumes 
i t s job of ~onetary manag e:nent , Canada may be able 
t o establi sh a new fixed excnan g e rate.* 
Canada ' s Ection in free ing t he dollar l ss t yeFr e.s 
wel l as her de v a luation of t h e doll a r i n 1 949 was necessitated 
by t he L .ct thc:.t she ho l ds a. un ique position between the 
Unit ed Stat es and Britain . The devaluation in 1949 followed 
a similar devP l uati on of t he British pound sterlin~ . That 
a ction w s t ak:en i n order to assure a ;naxi mum amount of tr de 
-::-21, p . f . 
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v ith ~r i t ~in whi c h in the postw&r period has had to mcintain 
~ ri ~id cost and pri ce structure . The unpe g ing of the dol -
lar on Sep t e 11ber 30 , 1 950 , was d esi ned to h8 l t t !:J.e f li .·ht 
of 1 .neri can capit a l to Canada . 'I'he 2,re a t influx of Acne ric e.n 
canital t h r eatened to bring Vlii t h it inf l a tion and h i ghe r 
p rice s . 
In order to a voi d t he se undesirable effects , anada 
returned to a freely f l uc tuatinb exc han g e r ate , rejectin~ t he 
only other al t e r nB.ti ve, a ne w fi x ed parity. 'r he InternE!. ti orril 
KonetBry Fund , which has, f rom its v e ry incep tion, b een ou· .. 1osed 
to f l u ctua t ing rates of exc han g e , i s s ued the following s t te -
ne nt: 
nThe Fund recognizes t h e exigenc ies of t he s ituB. tion 
which hF ve l ed to t he prop os e d p l an , a nd t a kes note o f t he 
L~t ention of t he Cc nadian g overnment to remA. in in consul t a -
tion ~i th t he Fund and to re - es t abl ~sh an effective p r as 
soon ~:~ s ci r cu::ns t a nces vtarrant . n -::-
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Cl APTEn V 
TlfS HI ST0::1Y O.P THE C NADI A1~ }-_'XCiiAlTGE PROBLE:.1 
A. Qan-d~~~ Doll~r, l SOO to 1930 
Careful examination of Chart 1: 1 (page 71) d"scloses 
the fact that the Canadian dollar has tended to depreciate in 
re lation to the United States rlollar only when the current 
balance of payments has been unfavorabl e or has threatened to 
be co.ne s o in the near future . However, t he correlation is 
only clearly apparent i n t he period prior to 193 9 . During 
the past twelve _ear s the artificial control s of t e exchange 
rate by the Forei ~n Ex change Control Board have obscured t he 
relationshi p between the current internat ional b alance and 
t he dis counted dollar, which is indicated on Chart #2 (page 
r ; ') ) 
~~ . An analysis of the co~ lation in the earl ier period, 
olus an investigation of t he fundamenta l changes whi ch ' 2ve 
taken p lace in recent year s wi ll provide a bas e for a practi -
cal solution of the current forei gn exchange prebl e ~ . 
From the year s 1900 to 1 915, t he Canadian dollar 
renained close to parity with t he Gnited St a t es doller . How 
~as this p ossi t le when Canada had a t t he sa~e time a l arge 
debit bal ance of payments? Chief l y it wa s due to the fact 
that huge amounts of external capital (Principall y British) 
were i :rrported . These impor ts of c ap ital provided t he means 
to pay off indebtedness wh ich result ed from the excess of 
i mports over exports . Ti.J.e Canadian d ollar remained at par 
CHART I 
CA;'1ADil1N NE'T CUl1.RENr BALANCE 08' I NTERNA TIO NAL PAYi~1ENTS 
AV"Fi.AG2 A:J.t>WAL ·mOTATION OF CANADI AH DOLLARS H T THE 
Ui,!I 'r ED S'l'ATE S 
(canadian Investment 
and Forei gn Exc h ange 
by J. F . Park inson, 
TJ . 107 ) 
-: :--;~~ 
*Net Current Balance in Millions of Dollars 
.;:--::-canadian Dollar :,~uotations in U. S . Dollars 
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be t ween 1 900 an d 1913 be c a use of a net incre ase in f oreign 
inves t ment in Canada of 2 , 373,000, 000 dollars. 
Th e exp l a n a tion of the consistent debit balance in 
her for e i gn tre.d e in t he t wo dec ades p r i or to \·iorld V'iar I i s 
rela tively simp l e . Canada , y oung and comparatively unde v e l-
oped , v.rss experiencing a boom p eriod. Neither t h e physical 
r es ources nor the productive capacity of t h e n a tion wa s ad e -
ou a t e to ~ee t t h e demaDd for tremendous quantities of cap i-
t Bl and con sumer go ods . I mp orts fro :n both t h e Unit e d Sta.tes 
a nd Gr ea t Britain s oar ed to n ew hei ghts which resulted in a 
c onstantly increa sing unfavorable bal ance of trade. 
After 1915 Canadian exports exc e eded imports for 
fo ur years, obviousl y a reflection of the incre a s e d demand 
for Canadian commodities by the a llied powers during Vvorld 
t ar I. Canada began to rely on favorab le trade balances as 
a s ource of foreign cash to meet her obli gations, and no 
long e r wa s dep endent upon capital imp orts as a means of set -
tle ment. Net income from tourists b e g an to appear as a debit 
in her trade bal ance md has since become the source of c on-
siderable sums of forei gn exchang e. A rap id expansion in 
Canade, 1 s manufacturing industry, whi ch hs.d started a t the 
be g inning of the century, was accelerated by the war. A 
vast number of industrial workers were trained, thus forming 
a nucleous about which a mi s hty industrial structure was 
bui lt. The s a le of the p roducts of t he greatly expanded in-
dustry wa s no p r nblem, for the allied powe rs provided an in-
s a ti a ble demand for Canadian exports. 
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v; hen t he war ended in 1 91 8 , the market for Cane.dian 
ur oducts c ollaps ed ove r night. Current bal ance s de cl i ned f rom 
a h i 3h of 2 , 369,500 , 000 dollars t o 1,965,200 , 000 d olla r s in 
1 91 9 . By 1 920 Canada ' s war ti~e favorab l e balanc e of trade 
disappeared , and the Canadian dollar had severe l y depre ci a ted. 
Subs equent year s correc te d t he depre c ia tion of t he do l lar. 
The correc t ion was brought about by an increase in t he vol-
ume of ex ternal trade , some recovery in prices, inc r eased in-
ve s t~ents by Americ ans, and a rise in t ourist revenue . i~ ost 
of the maj or p owers offic ially went back to t he gold standard 
in 192 6 . Canada fol lowed sui t, and pari t y with t he American 
dollar wa s r estored . 
The s t abi l izati on , or near stabil i zetio n, of 
exchange rn t es ~as a chieved be c 2us e t h e moneta r y 
aut hori ty in each c ountry kep t its currency c on-
vert ible into a fixed we i gh t of ' Old . For instance, 
t h e American a u t horiti es k ept Americ an currency sta-
b l e in ter~s of g ol d: they b ou gh t and so l d g old in 
exchange for n otes a t a p rice whi c h us ed to be ~20 . 67 
ne r ou n ce, and fr ee i mp or>t and export of t he me t a l 
we re a llowed. The Canadian authorities did likewi se . 
Thus it ca:ne ab out t h at t he Ame ri c an do ll a r was 
worth l /20 . 67 of an ounce of gold; and t he Canad i an 
d oll ar wa s a lso worth l /20 . 67 of an ounce of g old . 
Thing s wh ich are equal to t h e sa e t hing are equal 
to e& ch oth er. fi nd t h e Canadi an d oll a r would a l w y s 
have been worth exactly one Ame r i c an dollar i f t hey 
had been converti b le into, an d out of g old a t t he 
sa~e p l a ce . Actua lly , however , t he convertibility 
of t h e tmerican dollar was m. int a ined in New York 
and t ha t of the Canadi an d olla r in Montre a l. ( Con -
verti bi lity was mainta i ned by t he au t horities in 
othe r count ries as we ll, but these are t he one s t ha t 
concern us . ) 'rhus the v a l ue of t h e tw o cu r renci es 
could diverg e to the extent t ha t there was a co s t 
involved in shippi n r; t he s old bet11ve en Hew York and 
h ontrea.l. 
-::-s , P . so 
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In 1 929 Canada. ' s debit bal ance in her inter nationa l 
ba l ance of payments was 371 ~il li on dolla rs. ~conomic con-
ditions throughout t h e world we r e cha otic, and t he Canadi an 
- ,· overn~ent r e stricted t he exp ort of g ol d . Thi s Vi&s, f or a ll 
practic a l pur o oses, a departure fro~ the ~ ol d s t andard . Ca-
nada b e g n a period in which t he dolla r was pe r mit t ed to 
f l uctuate fr e ely. 
B. Canadian Ex cha ng e Preble~ , 1 930 to 1 939 
One of t he ~e st interes ting cha racteris tics of the 
Canadian exchanbe ra te during t h e thirt ie s i s revealed in t he 
statement by G. n . J a cks on, made in Decemb er 1 933 . 
"A s tudy of t he rel a tive ~ovements of sterling and 
t he Canadian d olla r day by day duri n g t he t v,: o years fo llowi n g 
Seo t ember 1 931 s h owe d t h is tendency for t he do l l a r to f a ll by 
ab out h~1. l f as :nuch a s the de cline in s terling . u.;:-
This tendency i s p e r haps no t surprising when t he 
t ri arig u l a r pattern of Canada ' s f orei gn trade is considered . 
'r:!:1e abandonmen t of t he s o l d sta.ndard by Britain i n 1 931 h&d 
profoun d effe cts up on Canada ' s forei :n tra de a s d id t h e sub -
sequent dec line in the val ue of t he p ound sterling . In or de r 
to p .y f or h er imp orts fro~ the Unit e d St a tes, Canad a i s 
l a r ge l y depende n t up on the conver t i b ility of t h e pound st e r -
li n g into American d oll a rs . 
-::-.)'? , p . 
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The dec line in t~e value of sterl ins ~ould retsrd 
tne :::E.le n ~ d' 01 ivEra l2.n exports in t~e ~nl ted Kin~do~ be c ause 
of t~1e re l Gtivel y hi_)1er price o · su cll fX· ort s .: it~-:.in t he 
f'e. ' ltc·rna tivc:. .~ll"rke ts for t~1e con nodi ti es .nich sne sells 
to the UnitG~ ~ln_do·t . T~crefore, despite the ~eprcc i ~. t: on 
of ste rl:i. n 0 end tlle d i fficul ti es of convertin.; s terl:i. n 0 into 
·~ericQn ~c l lers , she ~ ill cont~nue to sell to the United 
.:: i n'-' o:J. , l-ut c.t c:. so .ner;het lo ie r price . L o~Ho r rices in t e r -ns 
of f;nerict>n c:Jc ll ~::>s .:leE'n t hE.t the bE; l an c t: of p y ·.1ents \Vi 11 be 
8 f f e c t; e d ad v e r s e 1 y . The n e t .:: s u l t w 1 11 ;) e E' do v, n w c r d pre s -
sure un0n t he c~n~~ier dol l er , b oth i n London end ~ew !ork . 
Lov\'e r ry ric es tno:c Frl t is_J. e· nor t s \··.ill oe the DE't 
effec t of a de clin e in increcsed i.n orts of br:l tish 6 oo,)s :i.n 
':::s.nedE . _ n incrcf'se i1' ::. .. 1_rorts v:i l l in turn ::> edL·ce t~1e net 
bnl::nce of p y.nents \.itll thE~ tlnitEd :;··in.:.dcu ~J.t'ov.L, ~-n,_, l ess 
3pecul &tors cnti cl 2tin~ t~e de~rcci~tion of the 
ir.. securit i c:.:: . ';1~.e~· · .. ill sell ::;E.u::..d l.rn securities ,-it::.-1 t,1e 
intention of buyine, t~.:.e .:1 b£ cL et tll.e cle '! r ec l c.ts-0 rL te of ex -
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and the demand for invest rnent c apital inside Canada wa s prac -
tically nonex istent . By 1933 the total me rchandise trade 
with the United States was but 27 per cent of its 1 929 value . 
The depression in Canada was severe and protracted, and ~uch 
social d istr6ss r esulted from falling production, a reduc -
tion i n forei gn trade , and falling p ric es . 
The greatly di minished inf low of ca.p i t a l f r om t he 
Uni ted States during the thirties wa s, in part a t l east, the 
result of the new p olicy of t h e Canadian governTient which re-
g arded ca.pi t a l imports wi th dis f avor . Canadian industry wa s 
ur t;ed to r et ire ol d s e curity 1 s sues , 2-nd t he sale of new is-
sue,g was discourag ed . This ne w policy wa s based upon t he be -
lief t h a t many of Ca nada ' s economic troubles could b e trcced 
to the heavy payments made in t h e form of div idends and in-
terest to fo re i gn countries. 
The rad i na l chang e i n the direct ion of c api t a l 
~ove~enm is indicated in the fol lowin; quotation: 
The distinctioD in Canadian e conomic history 
between t he 1 920 ' s, as a period of devel opmen t, and 
the 1 930 ' s , a s one of relative ma turity, is clearly 
shown in the his t ory of c ap ital movements betwe e n 
Canada and the United St a tes; the capital inflow 
which had been heavy in the earl ier peri od reversed 
its direction in 1 932 , and s oon be c ame almos t as 
h eavy an outward movement. The period whe n repay -
ments on old l oans exceed n ew issues, which had 
come even in t he 1 920 ' s b e t we en Canada and Great 
Britain, made its appear anc e wi t h the Unit ed St a t e s 
a f ew years l a t er . In 1 927 -1 930 the net issue of 
new Canadian s e curities in t h e United St ates av e r-
aged 1 70 milli on dollars each year; in 1 931 - 1 937 
ne t retirements ave r aged 60 million doll ar s annu-
al l y. Direct investment s of American c api t a l in 
Can a di a n enterprises, both of t he ' branc h - plant' ffirl 
other types , average d 25 million dollars in the ear-
lier period; but t he l a ter withdrawa l averag ed over 
50 million dollars e ach year.* 
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In 1931 Great Britain left t he g ol d standard. As 
explained previous l y, a drop in the value of sterling a l ways 
has a depressing effect upon the Canadian dollar . Sterlin ~ 
depreci ated rapidly in 1931, and the Canadian dollar also 
depreci a ted a t a rapid rate. F orei gn holders of Canadian 
securities has tened to rid t h emselves of t heir investments 
as t h ey had already for e seen that t he Canadian dollar woul d 
fo llow sterling in the downward spiral. 
~hen the Canadian dollar depreciated, forei s ners 
we re able to buy Canadian commodi ties at lower prices . This 
stimul a ted Canadian recovery , which was a lso aided by i mprov-
ing business conditions elsewhere in the world. The Canadian 
doll a r recovered and r ema ined c lose to pari ty until 1 939 . 
Thus , durins a period of f ew monetary controls, t he Canadian 
dollar prove d well able to compete with the Ameri c an d ollar 
up on even ter:ns. 
The Foreign Exchange Boa r d wa s estab l ished in Sep -
tembe r 1939 , im~nediately fo llowi n g the decl a ration of wa r. 
It •narke d t he first time in history that controls were estab-
li s hed over forei gn exchange transactions. It i mmediately 
fixed t he exc hange rate of ficially a t 90 cents in r e l ation 
to t h e A:nerican dollar . This ac tion wa s tak en to offset a 
-::-1 8 , pp . 136 -137 
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f l i gh t from the Canad i an d ol l a r, which h d d e ve l ope d i n Au g -
us t 1939 . I t :cnarked t he f ir s t t ime t ha t t her e ha d been any 
substantial depre ci a tion of t h e Canad i a n d ollar whi l e t h e 
Dominion enj oye d a f avor a b l e bal a nce of trade with t he United 
~ tates . Th e ear l y fort i es proved t h at Canada was a ctually in 
a p osition i n 1 939 t o f urth er i mpr ov e h er e x isti n g f a vorab l e 
ba l ance of t r ade li t h t he United St a t e s . The f li ght f rom t he 
Canadian d ol l a r a t t h i s part i c u l a r t i me 1Na s an exampl e of de -
preciat i on being caused by t he f ear of de pr e ci a t i on ra t he r 
than by any s ound e c onomi c re a son . 
The r e cord of t h e t h irti e s c on c l us ive l y p r ove s that 
t h e Canadi an dolla r can be maint ained very c l ose to parity 
with t he Ameri can d ol l a r except i n p e r i od s of financ i a l cri-
sis or whe n t h e p ound st erli n g i s bei n g d e p r e c i ated . Even 
in a c r isi s t he sharp depre c i a tion of t he Canadi a n d ollar is 
probabl y t he r es ult of psych olog i cal f orc es ra t her t han of 
e c ono ic fo r c es . I f t he fear of de pre ci a tio n i s r emoved , per -
h &. ps 2. sys t er c an be de v i se d which will make parity an ob j e c-
tive which c an be a ch i e v e d. 
C. Canadian Exchan;~ e ~robl e :n , 1 940 to 1 948 
The Canad i an d ollar was main t a i ne d a t c 9 per cent 
d i s coun t i n rel a t ion t o t he Uni t ed St ates dol l ar fr om 1939 
to 1 946 . Pe .: gir1g of the dol l ar c t a di sc ount wa s the f ir s t 
· ~ "f" c an t a ct i on of the ne wl y formed Forei ~n Fxchange Con-Sl __:,nl l _ _ _ 
trol Board . I t ~arked the firs t ti e t hat official r es tric -
eo . 
tions ha.Cl eve r bee n put up on f ore i _;n ex chan 6 e transBc ti ons 
in Can2da ' s his t ory . Prior to t h is t i~e, no l e~ l s lation had 
ever been ena ct ed which p r e vente d ~older s of Canad i a n d ollars 
fro~ buyin~ and 3elli ns forei~n exchan~e a t wi ll. '1'1 e price 
v.:1. ich t hey paid for fo r ei6n ex c han€;e e.n d t he puro o se it Wc..s 
to bs use d f or we re l eft to the i ndividual to d ecide . 
rhe Canadian transition fro~ a fre e ex chen~e syste~ 
to one of s ucc essful contro l s pre se n t ed diff ic u.l t 9 ro bl e.ns 
be c ause of' t he ,_reet imp or t a nce of internE, tiono l tr tm s a ct ions 
in it s e cono~ic l ife; t he clo se re l A tions~ip of CanPd i an in-
dustry end L:1e ric e.n industry throu;h t h e br~mch p l ant syst e::1 ; 
2.nd t he inexperience of the Canadian pe oDl v..i t h t he probl e. s 
of d oll ar short a~es . 
The ?rincipal ob jective of Canadi an e x chan~e con -
tro l "' 8.8 to ·ncke c e rtai n that t ~J.E- 8.nt icipated s hor t e;e of 
• :neric an d oll a rs would no t be c. _ ;:; rava t ed by t he use of 1.· . S . 
d oll ar s for nones s ent i2 l ntiTposes . Capital export s , ex , end i -
ture s by tourists, nd luxury i mports by Canadians with ex -
pand inc; inco:nes were co s idered n onessenti a l pur·poses . 
3efore t he war, Dritish sterlin; had been con •er t -
ib l e into P.11erican dolla.rs . This hed :112de it pos8ib l e f or 
Canad a to sett le he r a ccount with t he Jni te d S t a t e s eac ~ 
ye s.r. Debit be.l anc e s of pa~y;,1ent with the ' ni t e d 3 t a t e s coul d 
be offs e t by credit bal ances with Britain Lecause s terlin~ 
Sl. 
,, as convertible. .>hen ~e.r broke out , British exc hanse con -
trols \'.'ere establ ished ·rhich limit ed c onvertibi l ity . Brit a in 
Fas no l on.;er v<i lling to r c l e2.se he r p r ecious reserves of 
Jnl t ed 3tetes dolla rs fo r nonessenti s l purp o ses . 
In 1 938 Canad[l. r s exports of \ 2.r r.1Gterials t o cri t -
ain we r e i ncressinc::., raoid ly v. i t h the pro::qJec t of fur t h er in-
crec. se s as t~1e v;ar progressed. Conse quently , Canad i Em in-
co~e s we~e ex_nnd in~ . The add it ional purc~asin~ o ower in the 
h£nds of t he people had to be cont r oled in order to o r event 
ncut e d oll a r shortages r esult in; fro~ expenditures upon non -
essenti a l 0 oods and servi c es . 
In ~e nera l, ex chan£e control worked out well dur -
ins the years of hos tilities elthouBh t ~ere we re seri ous d e -
ficiencies of United St ates dollar exc han&e durin~ t he years 
1 940 and 1 941. Ee r a t her serious situation at t ha t ti ~e 
was ee sed by an L:nerican-Canadian g overm:1ent a;r e e .nent r ea ched 
a t Eyde Park in 1 94 1 . Under the t erms of this a g re ement , the 
United States Rsr eed to buy fro~ Canada nunitions, ships , and 
s t rate~i c ~a t er i a l s needed by bo t h Br itain End the United 
"3 t c. tes. Thsse i te::1s we re purchased d irec tly f r o:n CanadB by 
t he Uni ted St a tes and we re then transfe rred to Brit ain under 
lend - le as e . Thus Canada ~ as en bled to earn do l lars rather 
than i nconvertibl e sterl ing . It r lso en&Jled he r to use her 
:n8np ower _nore effective l y i n Vi c..r pr oduction . f riar to t he 
agre ement, a subst ant ie.l pa. rt of Canadian ma npower had b een 
engaged in .;old p roducti on , c a t er in~; to P.:!leri c a.n tourists and 
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o t he r ~ursuits des igned pri~ari ly to prod u ce d oll e r exchan~e . 
Under t he Hyd e Par k agre ement , wa r product ion was intensified 
8.nd nonessential e :ilploy:ne nt mi ni:ni z ed . The f a ct t ha t Canada 
the r ee.fte:::> built up subs t an ti a l r e serves of Uni t ed .States 
dol lars . ust not be construed as war prof iteering , as is ex-
o l ~ined i n the followin~ quo t a tion . 
I:r.. C nada ' s trBn s a c tions ·w1 t h the United 
Sta t es and other d oll a r count ries, 1940-1941 show 
net loss of exchan; e , whi le 1 942 -1945 show n et 
ga ins . As the ne t gain in reserves of g old a n d 
Unit e d St8t es d ollars amounts t o t h e considerable 
su.l'J'l of 1,214, 000 , 000 do l Jsrs , Canadians lik e to 
ex~ l ain et once , l est t hey be thought t o have prof-
ited fran ~arti~e arranGe~ents , t hat t his sum i s 
v l~ost co np l ete l y a cc ounted fo r by t he increase in 
!~ me ricP.n ho l dine; s of ou tst anding securities pur -
chased from residents of Ca nada during t he war . 
!s 7 8 pe r cent of these we r e Canadian securit i es, 
Canadc. 1 s be. l ance of n a-y:nents for t he .fut ure is wor -
sened no t onl y "ty t he 1oss of t he revenue fro ·E pre -
vious h old ing s of American and forei ;;n s e c uri ties 
but a l s o by t he increase in t he intere s t payments , 
c l ready a very considere.b l e i t e rn , and b y future 
deb its for security rede .np t i on s . I t wa s an infl ow, 
n oreover, VJhi ch we.s no t de sired and vvhic h, when it 
be c ame hef',vy , Canad i an au t h or i t ie s sou,;h t to d is -
courage but wi t h li tt l e ~ffect.* 
In 1 946 t~e Canadian Ex c h an g e Control Bo a~d re -
stored the Canadian dollar to parity with t he United .S t ates 
do llar . The Canadian b s l s.n c e of pay111ent s with t he l a tter 
had been be c omin · more favorab l e for a p eriod of five years . 
I n a ddi tion, a capi t e l inflow was provided by t he sale of 
Canadian se curities to J..me ric an inve s tors. United States 
dolla r reserves were a t an a ll - t ime high of more t han 
l, eOO , OOO, OOO doll a rs. 
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The question arises as to why a chans e i n exchan ·· e 
r a tes shou ld appear a ttractive to Canada in 1946 when she 
wa s in such s trong ~one tary and exchang e p osition. The an-
s wer is ~mple . Canada wa s seeking to insul a te herself fran 
rising ext ernal pri ces . 0 . P. A. h~d virtually been aban-
d oned i n t he United Sta t e s during the early part of 1946 , and 
p rices were risi ng raPidly . Canada ' s price level wa s lower, 
and price controls had not be en abandoned. The relative 
cheapness of Canadian s oods a nd securities conpared with 
those of oth er countries threatened to become t he basis for 
an i nflationary spiral in Canada . In order to prevent t h is, 
s ' e made her dollar rela tively more expensive in t e rms of 
f oreig n currencies. 
By r e val uating her currency upwardl y, Canada auto-
~ati c ally reduced t he cost of imports, offset to so ·ne de gree 
risinc; pri c es a broad, and made her own exports .nore expensive 
for forei gn buyeps , ·The lo ss of some of her export business 
did not worry Canadians at t his t ime because the ba ck log of 
orders for export products wa s l arg e . 
It soon became evident that rest ora tion to parity 
with t he American do l lar wa s inappropriately timed. A g ap 
appeared be t~een t he quotations for the official dollar and 
t h e unofficial dollar, indicating that t he official d ollar 
<as considered overvalued. Capita l imports virtually stopped 
and a flood of i mp orts fr om t h e Unite d Sta tes drained away 
t h e huge dollar r e se r ves wh ich Canada had accumu l a ted duri n(':, 
t he w2 r. 
In 1 947 the Emergenc y Exchange Conse r va tion 
p r 0gram institut ed prohibitions and quotas from 
t he United tates. hhi l e the volu:ne of .nany t ypes 
of i :nports, such as texti l es and oth er cons u.me r 
g oods , we s reduced by t hese restri c tions , t he value 
and vo l ume of some o t h er g roups of commodi ties rose 
a s a res ult of h i ghe r volume as we ll a s the h igher 
pri ces generally prevailing for most i mp orts f rom 
t he United tates in l 94e . . -: <-
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The Canadian ex chanse position i mpr ov ed consider -
ab l y follo winG t he i mp osition of import cont rols . Ot he r f c -
tors were equally as effective as import control s in bringing 
this about . Funds funne led i nto Europe under t he viarshal 
Pl an we r e soent , in many c a s e s, in Canada . Gold mining 'a s 
subsidized by t he Cana.d i an g overnment . Dome sti c and f or ei ;:£n 
business wa s e ncourage d by t ax reduct i on benefits, and l oans 
~ere obtained in t he United ~ t a tes . 
The e conomi c disequi librium which wa s the basi s f or 
t h e spe c u l a tive a ct i vity was due to t he inf l at iomlr y pres -
s u r e s wi t hin the United States as a direct resul t of t he 
Korean Vvar . _s p rices rose in the United States and the 
val ue of the dol l a r seemed certain to de cline furt h er , a n d -
jus t me nt in t he Canadian exchan ge r at e be c ame necessary . Ca-
nad i an pri ces had l agge d far behind those in the Uni t e d States . 
The purchasin g powe r of t h e Canadian d ol lar h~d , in effec t, 
been raised r e lative to the purchasing p ower of t he United 
St a t e s dolla r . Therefore, t he Canadian do l l ar was underval u ed 
a t t he old exchange rate of 90 . 9 ce n ts . Currency specul a t ors 
a nd investors sought to capital ize upon an expected rev a l u a tion 
up ra r d . 
-><-38, p . 948 
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~r. Abbott, t h e Minister of F inance, in explaining 
t .!1e g overnment 1 s a.ction in freeing t he C::mad i a n r'J oll ar, s " id 
in par t: 
n influx of funds on this tre~endous s c a l e 
·woul d , if it continued , be like ly t o exe rcise an 
inflationary influence a t a time when Canadian g ov-
ernment p ol i cy i n ..:• 1 1 f i e l ds is dire cted to co:nbat-
ting inflationary deve lopments . The accu~ulation 
of foreibn exchange unde r such conditions woul d 
mean s ubstant i l incre a se in Canada ' s 3roes fo r -
ei •n d e b t and annu al s ervice charges wi thout any 
correspond ing increase i n its p roductive re sources 
or ability to export. It was t heref ore de sirabl e 
to put an end to t his invol untary b orrowing . To 
nov e t he ex change rate back to parity wi t h the 
United Ste~e s ~oll ar ~i ght bring a s t op to t he in-
ward movement of specu l ative c apit a l, but such a 
chan ;se would not neces sar ily be just i fied by funda-
~enta l cond i tions , and mitht be found to r equire 
re versal or further adjus t ment with in t h e not too 
distant fut ure . To move the exchange rrte to any 
othe r fixed p oi n t woul d be oo en to the s ame ob jec -
t ions . -::-
D. Canadian :2:xchan~ f ro bl em, 1 949 to 1 95 0 
The Briti sh poun~ sterling wa s devalued on nept em-
ber l P , 1949. In re l ation to its for~er exch n ge val ue of 
) 4 . 03 , t he ne~ r a t e r epr e sented a depreciation of 30t p er 
cent . However , when t he depr e ci at ion is vi ewed i n its r e l n -
tion to the merican dollar , a more r adic l de cline in v a l ue 
is n oted. De v a l ua tion of t he pound by 30~ per cent means 
that t he dollar was increased 44 pe r cent in its purchasing 
. ower i n Britain . 
The British ahnounc ement c a~e i n t he backg round 
of reu e a t ed de ni a ls that anythi n g of t he k ind woul d 
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be considered. Faced wi th an i~perative n e ed to 
reduce British costs 2nd pri ces to forei e;n buyers, 
the ch oice set tl ed d own to defla tion, wi t h ac com-
nany-Lng une mployments and busine s s f ailure s, o r de -
val uation , with the risk of resti:nul at ing i n t e rnal 
p rice inflation . 'rhere coul d be n o question, Sir 
Staff ord Cripps stated, of t h e British a ccepting 
def l a tion a s t he way out . 'Time is now so short 
and our res erves have gotten so low that a chan ge 
in the dollar rate of exchange i s t he only way in 
whi ch we can get our pri c e s d own qui ck l y enough . 
~ e had h oped that growth of our produ ctivity and 
other i mprove ·nents woul d have made this unne cessB.r y , 
but events moved too fast .' * 
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The a ction by Britain wa s followed on Sep te:nber 1 9 , 
194 9 , by a d ownward re valua tion of t he Canadian d ollar by 9 
per c ent . The re was no other course open for Canada under 
exis ting exchang e control me t hods. Canada must exp ort to 
Britain and other sterling areas if she is to maintain h e r 
present h i gh st a ndard of li ving . The ~oment that s terlins 
was de va l ued Canada 's who l e economy was i mperiled. The c ost 
t o Bri t ain of Canadian exnorts had been effectivel y raised, 
and t he cost of imn orts fro :n Britain had b een lowered. Thi s 
meant t hat with a deva l ued p ound, Canada ' s bal ance of pay-
~ents with Brit a in wou l d be less favo rab le. Not only wou l d 
there be a smaller quantity of p ounds reali zed by t he exces s 
of exports over imp orts, but t heir v alue would be l ess in 
terms of dollars. If impor t s from the Uni t ed St a t es contin-
ued &. t t he s ame r a te as bef ore t he dev aluation of s terling , 
t he re VI ou l d be a serious disequilibrium in Canada ' s interna-
ti onal pB.;y:nents. 
~--34' p. 1 09 
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v; ha t is perhaps the mos t i:nporte.nt factor in exert-
ing down'Nard pressure upon the Canadian dollar i s the antici-
pation by currency speculators and investors that the Cana-
di an dollar would have to be depreciated because of t he dis-
equilibrium created by the devaluation of the pound. 
flight from the Canadian dollar and fro m Canadian securities 
would be the immediate result. J.,. f l i ght from the Canadian 
dollar woul d in turn be ~ore depressing in its effect than 
would all the other factors put together. Indeed, the his-
torical record of the Canadian dollar clearly proves that 
up on de valuation of the British p ound, the dollar drops much 
more sharply and to a lower level than economic conditions 
warrant. The decline of the dol l ar has been usually followed 
by a quick re cove r y indicating the steepness and depth of the 
ori g inal de cline were not justified. The reason for the 
sharp and extensive decllne can be lergely attributed to the 
opera tions of speculators and lnvestors. 
The Canadian dollar remalned pe gged at a 9 per 
cent discount in relation to the American dolla r until Oc-
tober 6 , 1950. Canada ' s current a ccount of international 
trade in g oods a nd services showed a moderate surplus in t h e 
latter part of 194 9 and early 1950. rlowever, t he effects of 
the deva l uation of the pound sterling in Sep t embe r of 194 9 
were reflected in a l ess favorable bal ance of payments with 
all nations in comparison with t h e year pri or to devaluation. 
On September 30, 1950, the Canadian g overnment, 
under the au t hority of the F oreig n Exchang e Control 
~ ct, cancelled the Canadian official rates of ex -
change w1 ich s ince Septembe r 19, 1949, had been cal-
cul a ted on t h e basis of a. 10 per cent pre11i um for 
t he United States dollar . hlr. Abbott, the Minister 
of F inance, stated that it had been decided not to 
es tablish any new fixed parity f or the Canadian dol-
lar at this time, nor t·1D prescribe any new of.ficia l 
fixed rates of exchange . Ins te ad rates of exchanbe 
would be determined by conditions of supply and de -
mand for forei g n currencies in Canada.* 
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Thus, for t he f irst time in eleven years the Cana-
dian exchange rate was to be permitted to f luc tuate fr e ely. 
A few days l ater in New Yorlc, the rs.te of exchang e had jumped 
to 95.5 cents from the former pegged v a lue of 90 . 9 cents. 
The Canadian g overnment announced that import restrictions 
would soon be l i fted along with remaining currency controls. 
A brief analysis of t he moti ves which impelled the 
Canadian g overn11ent to tak e this s t ep revea l s that in recen t 
months there had b een a fligh t of the American dollar to the 
Canadian dollar . The Canadian Fore i gn Exchange Board had 
netted about 300 million dollars in United States F unds dur -
ing t he month prior to Sep tember 30 . Again one of the ma jor 
r ea sons for the capital inflow was the speculat ive operations 
of individuals V'1ho recognized t h e fact that art upward revalu-
a tion of the Canadian dollar was pr obable , because of an eco-
nomic disequilibrium between t he t wo countries. The Canadian 
g overnment could see that money would continue to p our into 
(, .. 
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the country . Canadian go l d reserves at the end of Septe~ber 
were 1 .7 b illion dol l ars . 
The ap rooriate rate n icht be anywhere between 
nsrity nnd the 9 per cent discount recently in effect. No 
one could deter~ine in ~dvonce with any assurance a new level 
e.t -_,-:L'l ich to fi ~: the V2,lue of the Can2dian do ll ar, 2nd the ~ov -
ernment felt, therefore, that the rste of exchanc,e shoul d be 
l eft to be deter~ined by ~arket forces. 
'l"he Intern"'tionel _·: onetr.ry Pund was consul ted , and 
officially sanctioned the exchange rate ~hich is to be deter-
:·:ined by :J.arl-::et forces . __ care ful readins of t he ~retton 
.o o~s 1 e zree~ent, however , ind icates t hat a fluctuating ex -
change rate is expr essly fo r b idden. ~uotations fro~ t~o Ca-
ns.dian Guthorl ties, 'flhich v:e re both :nc.de in 1 947, suppor t 
t l1is view . 
~r . ~ . T. G. Hackett, econo~ic adviser to the Bank 
of ~ontreal , said: 
11 As a :nember of the International Aont-tary .:lund, 
Canada canr ot leave the exchan~e rate to b e de t er:nined by 
me,rket forces. n-::-
,,;r . .. . 1.-- lu.np tre, who served a s .l' immci c l ,·i.ttache 
at the Canadian 1~bassy in ~a shington from 1942 to 1 945 , 
said: 
"It is , of co·u.rse, not to be overlooked t~r. t , as a 




''contempl ate the substitution of a ' free dol l ar ' f or d oll a r 
vhose forei s n exchan3e value wa s offi c ially sanctioned.''* 
T~is is but further e idenc e that t~e Fund actually 
is very ineffect ive i n enfor cing i t s announced ob "ective s . 
\?1. 
DOLLJ.._R FO~ DOLLAH : lJE\; P,_:WPOSAL 
be t ween the Currencie s of Cana da and t he 
Unit e d t 8 t e s 
The following l et ter ~as r ece i ved by t he Na ti onal 
City Bank of Ne~ York f ro n an exas,er ted Canadian cor r csuond-
ent. It is a t yn ic a l ~ anedian citi zen 1 s reaction to the ex-
isting ~e thods of currency ex chan g e. 
If a Canadian visits t he United St a t es e.nd of-
fers our .bank of Canada notes in pay:nent of M y -
thing, wha t happens? Proba ble a b lunt refusal to 
touch t he stuff , or a t be st a ~hoop ing discount is 
t aken f or accep ti n b the~ . Even in t he b orde r cit-
ies t he procedur e is the s 8. e, ::md b a nk cashi e rs 
in suc h ci tie s knou , if they kn ow anyt h i n J, , that 
our note s a re as sound as any on ear t h . 
·r.hy is t h is? .hy are C ne.dians :nade to feel 
that Lm.e r ic a ns re l e;~ t e the . . to t he pauper c la s s 
in :nonetary matters? ·.re f...mericans not a\:&re that 
we are e 1 hard curr e n c y 1 country, our credit t akinG 
second p l ac e to none'! Tha t our financia l struc ture 
i s t he soundest on t he fe.ce of the e rth includ i nc; 
the United Stet es of Ameri c a? 
Yes, we 8re an intelliu e nt, pro :- r e s sive pe op l e ; 
2. b it on the c onservE,tive side pe r naps, but v. i t ha l 
n tion e~i nent ly sat isf a ct or y to do business with, 
c f a ct whi ch ~i ll b e endorsed by y our l a r g e bus iness 
concerns \'ihich f in' Cenad t he ir best forei n mar ke t, 
with c a s h on t h e barrel - head for everything t hey s ell 
to us . 
·. ·~ e 1fionder ce ase l e s s l y wh y our currency is so 
d iscriminated against , a nd trying to r ea son it out 
on a fa. ctua l bas is reduces us to frustrati on. The 
t h ing s i mp l y doesn 't make s e nse . * 
92 . 
If t he e conomic costs whic_ vv oul d be incurred we r e 
not too 2;reat , fevv financia l writers woul d opp os e t he in-
tenance of parity be t ween the Canadian and the .A;neric an dol-
l.s.rs . This thesis sugge sts i n b road outline an a lt ernative 
n l a n '-'Vhich would r e t a in :no s t of t he advm1tag e s of stable ex -
chan:; e rates whi l e simul taneous l y minimizing t he e cono nic 
costs whic h are ordinari l y ass oci a ted with stab le exchans e 
re t es . 
~/t r. J . B . Condliffe s tre sses t h e importance of ex -
c h an g e st abi l -t ty in a pape r prepar ed in 1 945 for t h e Com:nit-
tee on Inte r nationa l Economic Policy. 
It shoul d no t be for g otten , howeve r, that un-
s t a b l e curre n c ies a re i n themsel ves a ca uBe of e co-
n omic eteriora tion and demora l i zat io n . ~ hi l e st a -
bi l ization of t he exchans e r a tes is not a panace a 
for t he world ' s ec onomic i ll s , it i s cert a i n t h at 
t hose ill s wi ll b e aggrava t ed if t h e exc h a ng e rates 
a r e al lowed to f all into c onfused competitive de -
n reci a t i on. It is equally cer t ain t ha t there will 
be n o eff e ctive re su;nption of world trade unless 
t he exchange markets c a n be progr e ssively f r e ed 
from t heir p resent re stricti ons. -:H:· 
Under cert a in circumstances, Canada ha s been abl e 
to use curr·ency depre ci a tion and ap oreciation to her own ad -
vantage . In the y ears 1 939 and 1 949 , her curr ency w s depr e -
ci a ted i n its r e l a tion to t he United St a t e s do lla r . l n 1 946 
-~31, rt' 9 - 0 0 pp . '-' 
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and 195·0 , the Canadian dollar wa s revaluB.ted in the opposite 
di rection. In eech case the desired reaction took p l ace . 
The significant fact, very fr eque n tly overlooke d, is that 
s uc h re.lief is only te .np or ary. Each a djustment is inevita b ly 
f ollowed by further a.d justment s. Each succeeding adjustment 
bec ome s more costly, for s p eculation upon the possibility of 
the next adjust~ent wi ll cause a fli ght of capital across the 
borde r . If c arried to the extreme, specul a tion a lone, unsup -
ported by any b asic economic reasons, could conceivably force 
a. chang e in ex chan ge rates. 
The advocates of flexible exchans e rates cl ai~ t hat 
msn i pul a.tion of exchang e rates is a method by which i mp orts 
and exports can be c ontroll e d, thus bring ing about a more 
favorab le cu rr ent bala nce of international p a yments. Th is is 
very true, but once a gain the cost is too gr eat. A sudden 
change in the volume of either exPorts or imports must be 
followed by a shift in p roduction and l abor from one industry 
to anothe r. If Canada must suddenly export more newsprint, 
there must be a shift of manpower and materials to paper 
manuf a cturing . If Canada reduces her i mp orts of coa l, men 
and ma t erial s must be t aken from other industries in order 
to increase t he domestic output of coal. It is generally a c-
cepted that a country should specialize in the production of 
those g oods which she produces most efficiently. And a coun-
try should import those com~"!lod i ties which vvoul d prove more 
expensive if produced domestic a lly . 
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Trade between the United Stat e s and Canada is re-
tarded by flexible exchans e rates which prove to be an arti-
ficial barrier to mutua l tr de relationships. If a manufac-
turer in t h e United St a t e s contracts to sell b l ankets to a 
Toronto department store, he mus t, in determining t he price 
to be a s ked , c a lcul a te t he ri sk involved be c ause of p ossib l e 
exchange rate changes before the delivery da t e . A Canadian 
p l ywood ::1anufacture r -:ni ght be discourag ed f ro-:n openlng up a 
ne ' nlant to sun-o l y t he United St ates -:na r ke t because a c hang e 
in the rate of exchange mi gh t overnigh t r ai se his prices 
.bove the fi cure which t he trade was willing to pay . 
True inve s t ment capit a l c annot be induced to cross 
t he border be cause the f ear of monetary revaluations makes 
inves t ment i n Canadian securities specul a tive. Dividends, 
which repr e sent the corp orate earning s of ~any years , and a 
leg itim te y ield to the investor, may be effe ctively wiped 
out by the arbit r a ry a ction of the Exchange Control Board . 
Mr. i!V . C. Ballaine, in summing up t he advant a g e s 
of s t abl e currency rel a tionships, states: 
The a.r gument in favor of currency stability is 
that over a long pe r iod of time it wi l l l e a d to hi g-her 
li vin;:s st G.ndard s a ll over t he world. There is no 
ques tion of the benefi ts of the gr eates t v olume of 
trade between nations; the greeter the degree to 
1,. hich e c h country speciali zes in exploitin its 
p ar ticu l ar advant ages , the greater wi ll be t he g en-
eral welfare. This ~eans that countries, in or der 
to have t h e hi ghest living s t andcrd s p o s s ibl e , 
should p roduce t hose articles and services in hi ch 
they have comparative advatag es and exchan; e the 
surplus for g oods t hey do not produce . Any factors 
tha t interfere with the most efficient loc a t ion of 
industry lower the size of tbe total product, and 
h ence the s eneral welfare. Since currency insta-
bility hinders the international trade, the cost 
paid by residents of every country is his her prices 
and less g oods. -::-
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B. Basic Assu~ptions and Objectives of the Proposed Plan 
The proposed plan involves numerous v ariables. A 
complete study of t he effect of the variab les upon the me ch a -
ni s :n of t l1.e pro pos ed p lan, and vice versE>., would be too com-
p le x to be included in a paper of t h is typ e . The intention 
is not to p resent a detailed p rog ram, but r a t h er to suggest 
f or consideration a possibl e alte rnative to the present woe -
f1J lly inadequate syste:n. Parity of the Canadian a nd Oni tad 
States doll ers is the ultimate g oal. Attainment of t ha t 
goal without unreasQnable sacrifices ~ay be impossible in 
the near future by this or any other plan . I mprove~ent up on 
t he p resent system is p ossible , and this thesis wi ll have 
served its purp ose if it succeeds in convincing the reader 
tha t: 
l . The limits within which the exchange rate h a s 
been fluctuating in recent years can b e nar -
rowed. 
· 2. Narrowing t he l imits vd thin which fluctuations 
take place will prove more beneficial than 
har::nful to the economies of both Canada a nd 
t he United States. 
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3 . Parity can eventua lly be a tt ained by t he same 
me t h ods . 
Poli tic a l union of Canada and the United States is 
often seriousl y sugges t ed as a s ol ution to t he currency and 
trade proble ms of t h e t ·o countries. ~I'his is a chara cteris-
tic American oversimpl ification of the problem. I t fai l s to 
tak e into consideration the diffi culti es ~hich are invo l ved 
in the fede r ation of t wo ma t u r e na tions, one l r g e and p ower -
ful an d t he other small, p roud, and g r eat l y i nfl uenced by 
tradition . Strang e as i t ~ay seem to A~ericans , Canadians 
are content to maint ain their present re l ationshi p wi t h Brit-
ain e nd the rest of the United Kingd o~ . 
A customs union or fr ee trade area is no t spe ci f -
ically advocated a s a part of the proposed p lan. F r ee trade , 
if universal l y a dopted , would cortribute to hig her l iving 
standards throue,hout the VJO r ld . But, unfortunately , the r e 
is no unani mi ty of op ini on a~ong the various nations up on the 
merits of free tr ade . Tariffs must be r ec o5nized s & for -
:nidabl e bB.rrie r to trade be t ween Canada and t he Uni ted States. 
J s such , they wi ll most cer t a inly p ostp one t he day when a 
parity of do llHr for dollar can be realized . It is expected 
t ha t the Economic Pl anning Board, cre a t ed under the prop osed 
p l an , will have as one of its maj or functions the t ask of 
maki n g r e co :nmendations for the reduction or abo l ition of spe·-
c i fic tar iffs . 
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Illo 0 icd ~s it n~y appear to tne s t ud~nt of inter -
nationel trc.de , the f[:.ct re :::.ains t ilfl t neit 1e r v::·nr,dr:t., tl1e 
· .ni ted 3te. te s , nor '-- rita in could be e[ si ly induced to eb r.don 
tneir nro tecti re t ~ ri_ fs . Any a l ternative o l2n of currenc ~ 
copcrol su~~est d to C&n .. ,dr. E,s c so luti on to ' _er ec ono.ni c 
:Jrobl e .ns 1ni 2ht be E'U:n~12.rily re j e ct e if fr ee tr&de were to lie 
:·pc c ificd r-.n esscn t i['l condit i on to its successful oper£tio~ . 
In recent ye0rs t_~re has been & s roDi n~ ten ency on 
t~1o , E>rt of L>over n.nents to control nri c es P..nd W2 0 es . . n rbso -
l ute l :;r ri;id f'X chan. __ e rate i3 inconD £'.tibl e vd t h ri t;: id nr ices 
Hld .'e..be s , r.nd probrbl y coul d r:.o t cc .ne intain d . Provi ded r t 
lees t a li.n:i. ted s 11ount of flexi bility l s pe r ni t ted i n prices 
and .. &oES , t~cn parity of the Can~d:i.an. c.nd L~e ric an d oll2rs is 
nossibl e . Fve n t hou h ~rices anr wa~es are contro l l ed , t he 
fluc tuations &oove bnd be l o w parit y need not be of &s ~rec t 
~a;nJtude as in recent years . rJ r aduv l re l axetion of w::-rti:ne 
controls upon t l1e se imp ort".n t fCI.C tors is essenti a l f or the :nes t 
effe t ive r esul ts fro .n t ~e prop nsed p l an . 
In the c ase of se v er e de pre s sion or 8. rr run- aws.y" in-
f l a tioD in t he Unit ed .-· t a tes, t 11e· C nad i en e- ove r nnent i": ould be 
,ius tifi ed in. i ·np o sine; rj_t;id controls over t he excba nse rat e &.s 
:t did during corl d ~.e r II. Be ith er Canada nor any other coun -
try cBn b e expected to :112intain o:.:,ri t y of exc l18 n '.:;e r r t e s if t he. 
nri c e of p arity is e cono~:c disas t er . r a t ional e~er~encies of 
this t yoe heve to b e ne t by spe ci a l l esisl 8tion desi -ned to 
~ee t t he parti c u l a r situa tion . 
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The proposed . l e.n , primarily a pet>.ceti :ne p rop os e.l, 
i.s no t intended to be 2.n ans·wer to the p rob l e vns ~~hich \' oul d 
a rise in a Third ~- orld -'~ ar, or even t hose i :r:.vol ved in a n rc -
long ed pe r i od of int e r na t ions l reer:nament. Tre~endous e x -
-oendi t u r e s on e. r :no.!:1ents by t he Un i t ed .States for a number of 
yeor s woul d ne. c es sitste t he i mposition of ri ~id controls. 
Such control s ';".'i. ll no t only l-1andicao any pro ; ra'll based upon 
sound e cono~ic p r inc ipl es , bu t ~ay well :nark t he end of t he 
free e c ono:ny s o tr2.d i t ional with L e United Stat es . 
The prLna.r y and fore 1. ost objective of t he prop ose d 
p l an is to a ttain 3reat e r e cono:nic stabi l ity by providinG 
sreater stabi lity in tho exchang e r a te. The re are t hree dis-
tinct phase s of t he pr o.;r &.m . Fi rst, E-. sui tHbl e r2te of ex -
chan.::;e .nu s t be carefu lly se l ected . It wi l l :orobab l y be very 
close to t h e pre sent r ate of :L95 to ::-1. 0 0. F l u ctue.tions 
around this c a r efully se l e cted fi~ure will oe r estricted by 
t~e use of £: :ne chani S ;-}1 \':'hi ch re se~bl e s t he Br itish Equali za -
t ion , c c ount, '.'.hich ' .. 'as este.blished in 1 332 ; but in this c Fse 
it ~, ould be joint l y Odl!lin i stc red by Canadc. 2.nd t he United 
S t Ftes . 
The second pha ~. e \\ ill be dis ti ne ti ve bee a use t he 
flucturtin~ rate of t he firs t phase ~ ill be re p l aced by a 
ri :::;i d ex c .1anse rate. The nevv rate v; ill oe hic_her thr..n L e 
p revious r e te but l E8S t ian doller for dollar . ~e su ccess 
of tA e s e cond chase wi ll depend upon t he effectiveness of 
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the I.cono.ni c .t' l ann i n:::; Board, vvhose functio n s ·:::_i ll be- more 
fully des cri bed l &t er in t h is chapter . Pe r itr,_ ·:ill ~e.:_ 




'rhc third D:-: ase represents the u l ti nate ~v£.1 of a 
") Ee.rity of exchant;e in r;hic one Canadie,n do ll ar i s eau al to 
one United States do llar . The two doll a rs will be inter-
chB.n,;eab l e . 
Even in t he first phes e of t he pro ~:· ra'TI , speculation 
in Canadi[·n currency and securi ti es wi ll p rove l ess profit -
eb l e t han it has been in the past . If t e third p &s e is 
successful , spe c u l e. tion \: oul d be prac tic ally e liminated . If 
this one factor c an be effectively controlled , fluctuati ons 
in t he e xchan0 e rate wil l be g r e tl y reduced. 
As fluctua t ions in t he exchang e r a te are reduced , 
true inve st_ne nt c api t a l vdl l be encoura;;ed to f low a cross t c 
border in inc r easing quanti ti es to the . utual advanta6e of 
t he t wo countries . The dense r o f earnin~s being neutrali zed 
by e overnne nt 2l currency depre ciation wi l l be ~inimized. 
If t he propos ed p lan were do nted, t r ade between 
t he United Stat es and Canade. woul d expand, and e hch country 
coul d speci a lize to a g reater ex t ent in the production of 
those produc ts which it p r oduc es mos t e fficient l y. Dis loc a-
tions in the p roduc tive syste'TI , which inevitab l y follow every 
alte r a tion i n t he exchange ra te, would n o lonber occur . f ros-
pe ctive p roducers of export able g oods would be ~ore cert a i n 
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of realizinG a profit fran such operations. Contracts for 
t he future delivery of 30ods and the ex tension of credit 
would be l ess risky ventures than is now the c ase . The net 
result of expande d tr acle be t we en the t v o countries would be 
lowe r prices and a h i gher standa rd of living for each one. 
C. A Genera l Outline of the Proposed Pl an 
The proposed plan , which for t he puroose of this 
thesis will be ce ll ed t h e North A~eri can Monet a ry Agr ee . ent, 
wi ll be patterned after t h e International Monetary Fund. Its 
obj ectives wi ll be simi l ar in mBny r espects to those outl ined 
in the Bre tton \v oods ' agreement . novvever, the new bi l a te al 
a. ; ree :nen t should be of :nore p rEctic a l value than the inter -
national B'?reement of 1 9 44 . Tw o countr ies can be much more 
specj_fic in formul atiDg a p l an, designed to fit their own 
partic u lar needs, t han would be p ossi b l e if fort y - four na-
tions were invo lve d . Uur experience with international a2_ree -
~ents has been disappointing up to the present time bec a use 
of the great number of conflict:tng national interests among 
t h e signatories . On t he ot he r hand, bi l a teral treaties and 
alliances have worked out we ll in many instances . 
The 1J. A. lL A . woul d be ad~ninistered by representa -
tives of t he Federal Reserve Sys t em and of the Bank of Canada . 
Ne cess a r y powers would be conferred upon t h e lL A. NI. . by 
a ts of Conz r e ss and Parl i ment in t he respective countries. 
The ad:ninistra tors of t heN . A . ~ . A., in addition to ~eking 
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n olicy decisions, would fro :n ti :ne to time make recom.nenda -
tions to t h e Con gress and t o Parl i ament urg ing the enactment 
of le gisla tion necessary to c rry out the objectives of t h e 
'rhe objectives of t ile 1 orth American J'1onetary Agree-
~ent would be, in general, as f ollows : 
l . 'ro coopera.t e with, and a tt e 'npt to , carry out 
t he aims and objectives of t he International 
j·tonet a ry Fund . 
2 . To re gulate and f i x exchange rates . The proxi -
ma t e g oal: t he establi shment of a fixed parity 
between the Canadian and the Uni ted States dol-
l ar . The ultimate g oal: d ollar-for - dollar 
parity . 
3 . To limit the extent of f l uc tua ti ons in t he ex -
change rat e pending the es tablis~u~ent of a 
fixed parity . 
4. To ~ake t e functioning of an unofficial mar ke t 
in Canadian do l l rs unprofitab l e . 
5. To constantly promo te e cono~ic coordination 
be t we en t h e t wo countries. Seeking a l ways to 
supp ort t heN . P . M. A. official excha n ge rate 
by neutralizing t h e fo rces which t erd t o make 
it fluctuate . Limi ted price f l exibility mus t 
be r e stor ed . Imp ort res tricti ons , quo t a s, and 
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tariffs ~ust not be per~itted to influence t he 
exchang e rate unfavorably if it can be avoided . 
6 . To supervise and direct the operations of t he 
Equa l ization Account a nd t he Economic ~lanning 
Board. 
l n order to f a cilit a te stabilization of the e x c h ange 
rate, an Equalization Ac count is proposed . As its ns~e im-
Pli es , it is si~ilar in ~ any respects to t he Brit ish Equa liz e -
t i on Account, a stabilization fund of the credit t ype, which 
wa s es t abli shed in 1 932. The British a t tha t time sou~ht to 
support t he ex change r a tes of forei s n currencies i n oroer to 
p r e vent t h e p ou nd s terling from being overvalued on t he world 
marke t. The use of t h e Equal iza t i on Account wa s remarkab l y 
successful in at t a ining thi s objective. 
The American St abiliz a tion Fund of 1 934 wa s re -
jected as a mod el f or the p roposed p lan because it is of t h e 
s old-typ e , and as such would cre a t e interna l disturb ances in 
the :non ey marke t, wh ich mi ght well offse t a ny 2.dvan te.;:;e 
::::_a i ned by st abilizing t he exchang e rate. 'The inade quaci e s 
of t h is pa rticular type of fund are indicated in the fol low-
ing quot'"'tion: 
The g ol d-typ e fund d oes not , however, prevent 
interna tional dis turbance from pr oducing in the 
money ~arke t effects simi l~r to thos e experieftced 
under t hB gold s t andard .... I t i s in respe ct to 
t h e effec ts of t heir on e rations upon the money mar-
ke t t ha t the main distinction be t we en the g ol d-ty e 
a nd the credit-ty · e stabi li zation funds li es .. .• 
-:,.-l1.e -reas the pu.rchase of fore1 gn exchang e by 
the .B.~nerican Fund releases Fede ral Reserve Bank 
funds to t he co:nmercial b nl{s and thus enle.r~; es 
t '-,e credit base of the :-ne:nber ban~~ s, the opera -
tions of t h e British Equa l ization Account causes 
no such enl c rge~ent of t h e credit base . . The 
impo t ence of the ft~erican ~ t b i l ization ~und to 
neutrc lize t he effects of l arg e inf lows o ~ forei~n 
capital upon t- e ~oney :narke t l ed the ~meric n 
~onetary authoriti e s in 1 936 to adopt a procedure 
simi l ar to tha t fol l owed by the British ~; qual i za -
tion l'. ccount. -::-
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·.,hen the Br i tish Equa liza.tion J~ ccount was ori g in-
a lly established , its reserves consisted of Treasury Certifi -
cates . ~"ly.-ot ~etic s =:. E'Xt::,.:_.p e v; j ll be the si :np l a st way to 
illustra te t he ~e chani sm of the Equalization Acc ount. If 
Count r y A 's forei 6n exchFnbe demonstrated we k ness on t he 
Lond on :n rlre t, t he ~quc.lization Account sold o:ne of its 
Treasury Certificate s to the com:ner c ial banks or to the 
":J. oney ma r k et. The Droceeds of these sal es were used to pur -
c hase forei s n exchange of Country A . Thus the sterling in-
valved was re s tored to t he money market without c ausin:: any 
d o~es tic disturbances in the :noney market . At th s8 :ne time 
Coun try [ 1 s exchan~e rate ~as su~o orted . 
In the p rop osed so l ution to t he Canadi en p rob l e:n , 
the :ne chanis:n of ad justment 'lould be fund a:1er..to l ly t~ e sa:ne . 
The ma jor d "ffer e n ce woul d be in the s our ce of reserves . 
Under t he present syste~ proposed, the reserves Koul d be ere -
a t e d by contributions of · r easury Cert ifi c a tes in equa l 
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a~ounts by both the United States end Canada . 1'he .:.d:ninis-
tretion of t he Account ~ oul d , ln this case , b e bi lat e ral 
:at1er than unilateral, as in the british sy st e~ . 
The success or fai l ure of any stabi l ize.tion fund is 
dependent upon the extent of it s r eserv e s . One of the advLn -
taces of the credit-type fund is tt~t ~ old reserves are not 
reouired . Re serves a r e only limit ed by the seneral credit 
of thE t;ove rn.nen t End its abi lity t o sell Tre sury bi lls to 
the co .. 1~:1e rcial bonks or in the money .narket. 
If individur.l s bel ieve that 8. den letion of a fund ' s 
resErves is i wninent , t hen a fli..::_ht fro :n thE. currency bein.; 
s1x CJorted viill dcve l oJ . ~et has been one of the ~ajor ~eek -
r:esses of excban£:_e control as edt1inistered by the Cano.di9n 
The reserves t hat wi l l t e cvaile b l e 
for the ~aintenance of t he anad i~n and United State, do l l8rs 
at pari ty, under the u roposed plan , ~auld be li ~i t ed onl y by 
the credit of the t wo nations invo l ved . .L o lor>g as the tvvo 
nations c_ose to sup -ort the exlJtin~ ex chang e rate, currenc y 
nd securi t y snecul ators coul d not fo rc e Canada to de reciate 
its dollar . The knowl edbe of the fact t ha t t he t wo countries 
~e re co~mi tted to preventin~ depr eciation of the C.nadiEn 
dollar woul d remov e one of the n ost i ~port nt ceuses of de -
p reciation . 
. :eny r:ri ters on ,wne t e r y policies scknowled~e the 
~eri ts of usinc stabl li ~ti on funrl s to prevent minor f l uctu-
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~tio~s in the exche n~e rate, but at the sane ti. e csser t t ha t 
st.sh.: l izf' t ior> fun's c an.r,ot correct for funda. Jental dise·~uili b -
riu~ in the b~lsnce of p~ynents . They ri _htfully contend t e.t 
B se~ i ous ly unbal anced i nternatlon~l position ccnrot be cor -
~cctcd b y the use of stabi lization funds. 
n these ar3u~ents , they a_e 1 00 pe r cert correct . 
nowe v e r, t e are 1 00 :e r c en t irons if, in app lyin~ the ir 
theories , t hey esser t thHt a fundE . .:t!.ent~"-1 dise uilibriuc-: ex -
isted be t v: een Cenr.dH r nd the United j tates on three different 
occ&sions durin~ the pnst five ye "rs . A we ll -mana ~e d stabi-
li zc ti on fund could ho e prs ented at l eas t t~ o of these s o -
c a lled fund .cnente.l disequi libriu.ns . Con c ess ions a&ve al-
reedy been ~~ e i n the first section of this c hap t er in re -
~ Grd to fundanenta l disequilibriu~ . It is ~d~itted th~t a 
.:1~ ~or v:s.r, an Pr:na.nent s ' race , run - av;sy inf l ation , or a se -
vere r1 ,. r ession re quire er:1er~ency me asures 9bove snd oeyond 
t1e use of stabilizatio~ funds . F urthe r n ore , the correcti ·e 
cn e asures re quired in c_ises of this rn.ture Cc,n only be deter-
~ined rs the emer;ency develops . 
In the p ropose d l an , a n Scono~ic Pl annin~ Board 
woul d be e r ect e d . Its Ba jor function ¥oul d be to p rona te 
e cono~lc coordination between the t ~ o econo~ies. f b otn 
countries e.re convinced that so .. 1e price contro l s and subs i die s 
_,,ust be :::w inte.i ned , an E:J.,fOI't s ~noul:J. be :n""_de to institute i1ro -
".,ns \.-:1 icJ. r. lll be correlst ed . It shoul d be th r:. consistent 
policy of the Boa d to .na e reco :1. e ndations for the re:nova l 
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of trede t'arriers . Tari__ s, quotas , nnd i.aport restrictions 
s ~1ould be subject to constant analysi s . If found to be det -
ri~entel to bo t h countries , or i f t~ey e er t undue influence 
unon the ex c han,;e r&.te , reco.:mendE tions shoul d be made for 
tneir re' oval. 
The Lcono.nic J?le.rmin.:_, Eoard is perh -'.ps t he nos t L -
-por tant feature of' the 1.\ ho l e , ro 3 rem. It is the real innov&-
tion under the pro osed p l an , for the ~qualization Account 
nd t~e ~onetery -· ~reement are ne rely ~odificF tions of re -
viously conceived p lans . E~ : canonic Plannin~ Bo e rd ls En 
atte1 t e t bilatera l control of the variab l es which exert 
pres sure u_ on t he exchan;:;e r ete . It is en at te ~m t to prevent 
the freque nt r ecur rence of f und"_nenta l d isequilibriu:n by 
eliminatin~ so~e of its causes . 
Canada and the United dtstes have traditionally 
b Een ~ree econo~i e s, and no c han6 e in their status as such 
is su~6ested in the thesis . The £ Cono~ic Pl anni n~ Board 
woul d not po ssess dictat orial p owers over the respective 
e cono._i es . tiowever , l ee::,is l ation would confer upon t he Board 
tte power to put into ef:ect t enpor e ry corrective measures 
~henever it was deened necessary in order to a c hieve ~reater 
equilibriu:n in international trade . Pll such :ne sures v.:ould 
auto~ati cally be invalidated unl ess rctified by bo th C on~r-ss 
6nd t~rl ie~ent wi thin so~a specified nerlod of tine . 
The Board t s objectives woul d be lone ter~ rather 
t han shor t tern in na t ure. The procedur e followed "oul d 
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~ese~bl e t ha t which is used effectively by lgrge indus tri a l 
corporations . 3uc h corpor 8 tions make use of every avai l ab l e 
sourc e of infor ... a tion to p redi ct t he ir future needs in ':lan-
1) 0Vle r, .::1e teria l s, and cap it a.l. A ·oudc;e t is prepered , and 
p ro Cl uction is sc edu l ed to mee t t :te :-r.arke t d e :nand w~:ich is 
2!' tici a t e d. 
The f l ann i nb Bo 2r d woul d use the most ~od ern sta-
tist i c E<. l ~.1e t h ods in a ccu:nul a tint:, d ati?. which would prove use -
f u l in the t asY of coord i nating p roductio n and ~ak i n: the 
:nost effi c ient use of each country's resources . The use of 
statistical da t a woul d fe.ci li t e. te the d i sc overy of p otentia l 
c 2.uses of d isequi l i briuc-n . On c e the p o tenti a l c auses were 
found , p reve ntive measure 8 wo u ld be a ppli ed i :n:.ned i a tely . ln 
turn , t h ese woul d be c a lcu l ated to minimi ze t~ p ossibility 
of future dis e aui li brium . Ir.. the past, t he e .nphasis ha s been 
uD on ad justme nts to the e x cha n g e rate r. fter the di se qui l i bri u ,n 
had apuee red . Under the p roP osed _l an , t he "7 cono:ni c Pl anning 
Bo a r d ~ould have the res p onsi b i lity of neutral izins the forc es 
v.hich b r i n .; about t he di s equi l ibriu::n . 
If research cond ucted by t he Fcono~ic P l annin~ Eo a r d 
indic a t ed t ha t Can~da :ni gh t soon be experi enci n g a shor t age 
of united S t a tes dollars , a prog r am of enc our a · ing c aP it a l 
i mp orts fro~ the Gni t ed Sta tes woul d be underteken. Cap it a l 
i mPorts '>'< ou l d in t hemse lve s off s e t, to a c er t a. i n ex t ent , 
Can da 1 8 u nf avorable balanc e of tr&.d e. 'l'he c e..p i t a l whi ch was 
i mp orted should be used to b u ild fac to i e s, the products of 
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v:hich woul d replace some of the i terns which previously had 
been i:nported fro :n the L.Jni ted Sta tes . The Cane.di an be.l anc e 
of trade -would be co:ne •.nore favorable as imports from t he 
United States were reduced . 
If an unfavorable b a l ance of payments V;as forec &st 
for Canada , it might be possibl e, t hrough cooperative action, 
to divert to Canada some of the American orders that would 
otherw ise g o to other forei gn countries. This woul d be done 
in t he interest of econo~ic stabi lit y in Nor t h Ameri ca. lt 
mus t be cle B.rly understood that the entire pan is reciproc a l 
in ne_ture . If th e Uruted States mnk es a concession like the 
one outlined here, it is only fair t hat Canada ~na.ke s a.n 
equivalent sacrifice \·henever it be e ome s ne ce s sa.ry . 1V:: o st 
dec isions of the Pl anning Boa.r d wi ll b e c ompronis es. 
There a re an infini te number of ways in which the 
:pr opo sed ...'; c ono•nic Pl an_n in·;· Board c a n achi eve gr e:: .. ter ec onomic 
st abi lity be t ween the United States and Canada . A few of the 
.e t hods have been susoes ted here in order to denonst r ate the 
feasibility of the pl a n . Ec onomic experts , the bes t f ro_n 
each country, would b e del e gated the task of work ing out th e 
intric a te detai l s . 
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CHA PTER VII 
SU,;"'.'~A Y AND CONCLUS IONS 
A. uu-:n:nary 
Canada, a country of vast natural resources, is 
s till in the deve lop~ent s tag e . She ~us t, theref ore, con-
tinue for n ny years to depend on forei g n sources for invest -
me nt capital, c apital and consumer e,oods, and mar k ets for her 
exporta ble raw ·:nateria ls &nd ma nuf e ctur ed g oods . 
The living st a nd ard e njoyed by the Canadians is 
a~ong the hi 8hest in t h e world today. Trade with the United 
States has been a vitally important f ac tor in p roducing this 
r esult. Despite t he f a ct t ha t Canad'"' h a s traditionB.l ties 
wi th Britain, Canada and t he United Stat es are today each 
other's best customer . This mutual tr&de should be further 
encoura ged by t he removal of trade barriers between the t wo 
countries . ~xchange r ates hich are subject to frequent 
chang es are a formidable trade barrier and, as such, should 
be , ba:r..doned . 
Canada's industry , a lready expanded to mee t t h e re-
auirements of t wo world wars, must be encourag ed to i ncrease 
its produc tion of consumer g oo d s which are now imported from 
the United Sta tes . There are nany such co mmodities whi ch 
could be p roduced e conomically in Canada with a benefici a l 
e ffect upon the current ba l nee of pay:nents . Continued im-
p ort of c api t&,l g ood s, coal, tropical fruit s , and raw mate -
ri a l s is recommended . 
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Overs ::; as exports by Cana.da cere as vi t ally necessEry 
to her econo.cn ic well-being e. is trade with the United States . 
A l sr~e percent a 0 e of sue export s Ere a gricultural products 
which could not be sold in t he United States, a nd whic0 &re 
to o l::,~rge in volu·ne to be consu'TI.ed at home . .._:conom.i c a.lly , 
Ca nada is justified in contirniing production of t h ese co~­
~odities because it represents the ~ost efficient use of her 
resources. 
The British preferent i a l system, which formerly v'as 
an i~Dortant factor in Canadian e cono~ic p l anning , has become 
l e ss inf luent ia l in recent ye rs. Americ an do l lE.rs have be -
co~e nore a ttractive than pounds sterling. ~s this tendency 
b e co~es ~ore prono unced, ec ono~ic cooperation bet~een the 
t wo ~or th meri c an countries wi ll be faci litated . 
In proposing a p l an for exchang e rate stabilization, 
it is unnecessary to take the position t ha t exports and im-
c orts between the United States and Canad :nust £1 ays be in 
e quilibrium. Suc h is not the c a se, for Canada enjoyed a com-
car a tively prosperous peri od fro:n 1 900 to 1930, yet he r bal-
ance of tra~e with the rest of the world wa s a l ways unfavor-
ab l e . This Wl?. s m... de possibl e by t he i mp ortation of capital . 
In t he 1930 ' s t he Canadi a n r.;overnment be gan to dis -
coura f_:; e cap it a l i mnor t at ion and to encoura0e the retire:nent 
of securities which represented forel s ners' inves t ment s in 
CEmac!. i an industry. The success of this p olicy was re;na r kab1e, 
f or during the pe r i od 1 931-1 337 net retirements averabed EO 
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i lli on dol l ars annual l y . In recent years t h ere. h s been a 
reversal of this ide a , and Canada is onc e again a c apital 
i mpor t er . During the year 1 950 , over a billion do l la rs in 
new P~eric an c o ital poured into Canada . However, the Ko r ean 
·'. ar e.nd rear~a~ent in t he Uni te d States were the most i mpor-
tant factors in producing t h is resul t. Canada should i~edi ­
ate l y under take a prog r am desi s ned to maintain a capital in-
f low, even af ter t he rearmament progra:n has slackened . 
stabilized ex chant e rate would be a n i mport ant factor in 
a chieving t he desi r ed res ult. In t h e proposed North Amer ic an 
.ionet Et ry /~;sreement, caDi tal imports Vli oul d be a fundamenta l 
part of the ad justme nt me chanism. 
Canada has tod ay a sys t em unde r whi ch t he exchange 
rate is permitted to fluctuate free l y . lth ough offi ci a l ly 
sanctioned by t~e Inte r n a tional Uone t ry Fund, thi s policy, 
whi c h wa s adopted on Sep tembe r 30 , 1 950 , appears to be a vi-
ol ati on of t he objectives of t he ?un d as out l ined in t he 
. rti cles of ~ireement . The ma jor ad v an t age of f re e l y fluctu -
atin.~. exchang e rates is the aut omati c character of the adjust-
11ent of dise qui l ibriu.rn in international payments . This ad -
v nnta3e is ~ore t han offset be c ause of the susceptibility of 
t he exchange r ate to spe c u l ative i nf l uence . If t_e exchan 0e 
r a te i s expected to ris e , spe culators wi ll enter t n e for e i gn 
ex chan g e market . Their purchases vill create a gre a ter de -
:nend, which in turn wi ll cause the exc hange r a t e to rise stil l 
112 . 
hi gher . In the process , greater d is equilibrium be t we en t he 
t wo currenc i es wi ll occur. 
The purchas ing p owe r parity t he ory is mere l y a tool 
used by forei g n exchan;e a na l ysts i n emphasizing t h e interac -
tion betwe en the p rice l evels in t he respecti ve countries and 
the exchange rate. It is bas ic a lly an £t tempt to compute the 
mo s t eauitable exchan6e r a t e by establishing a ratio between 
t he Purchasing p oHer of t he monetary units of t he t wo coun-
tries. Usual l y the p roc edure i s to se l ect a representative 
z roup of commodit ies, com·oute index n umbers in re l a tion to a 
~nutually a greed upon base year , and t h en make changes i n the 
exchange rate t o equ a li ze purchasing c owe r. 
l1 'undanent a l ly , the t heo r y is :.ne rely an exposition 
of t he unde rly ing forces which make adjus t ment s i n t he ex-
ch::mge rate n e c ess ry. There ha s neve r been any serious e.t -
te~pt by any country to ac t ually d ~ust its exchange ra t e by 
this method . It woul d be i~practical be c au se t here i s no 
such t hing as a representa ti ve g roup of co:n.noditi es which 
coul d serve -s e sa tisf ac tory basis f or re gulating exchang e 
rRtes . However , i n the p l an proo osed in t h is paper, it is 
conceivable t hat t his t he ory mi ght hav e s o:ne p r &ctical value 
in t he work of t he u rop o sed l!,cono·nic Pl anning Boa r d . The 
t he ory is i ::1pr a.ctic e.l in se rvinc; as a foundation upon which 
e~1it ab l e exchange rates coul d be based . rlowever , ratios be -
t ween the re l ative purchasing powe r of t he t wo dollars in par-
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ticular s rouns of' com~odities :ni e;ht be useful in de t ermining 
econo~ic pol i c ies. 
The revie~ of the ~ o ld standard ha s served a useful 
purpose in this study because it has demonstrated t he many 
advantases of monetary stabi l ity . The like lihood of return-
in~ to the ~old standard is no t considered probabl e nor par -
ticul ar l y de sirable a t this tine . Depar ture f rom t he 6 0ld 
standard was retro; ressive in one i mp ortant r espe ct. '11he 
g old standard has a tendency to be internationa l in character 
w~i le mode r n man aged paper s t andard is strongl y nationa lis -
tic . Th is thesis ad voc ates a pro~ram which wi ll h&ve a tend -
ency to reverse t h i s trend in regard to the t wo countries in-
volved . 
Curre ncy depreciat ion is juqtifi ed in i nstance s 
where a fundamenta l d ise qui librium exists . The indiscrimim:. t e 
use of currency deprecia.tion wi ll, however , nulli fy any bene -
fits which misht be der i ved from its ~oderate use. It should 
rare l y be used , for it i mpedes tr ade , discourages l egi tim te 
international investment , a nd invites retaliati on by other 
countries. Sinc e it has come into vo s ue , currency depreci -
ati on has been frequently employed when its use was unwar-
r anted . 
The Internatione l ~onetary Fund was es tablished in 
the hone that t he member nAtions individual ly, in confo rmity 
wi th t he ir ob l i g a.tions under t he Ac;reement, woul d fo r mul a t e 
monetary o olicies which woul d encoura;e internationa l trade . 
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One of its main obiectives wa s to e l Lninate co·npetitive cur-
rency deoreciation. Unf ortun2 tely , in order to obtain as 
:n2ny 'Tie:nber n a tions e..s wa s Possib l e , fe w E•. ctua l obl i;ations 
1.'.~e re i :n"9osed upor: the "'i,snatory na tions. The t. 0 re e::tent vv as 
~ritten in very broad terns which ~ kes its interpretation 
su~ ject to wi de differences of opiLion . The Pund 1 s objec -
tiv e s a r e qui t e ~eri t orio u s, but in its short existence it 
has al ready e x h ibit e d funda:nen t a l weaknesses V•'h ich reduce 
its effectiveness. T. e :::Jorth A:-n.eri can 1.~ onet2ry F.[.sree ment, 
\'.'hi l e -p8 t t e rned after t he Interna tion2..l .-;lonetary .i.gree~l'l.ent , 
would be written i~ mo r e speci f ic l ansua~e . This wou ld b e 
possib l e because only t~ o IBtions are invo l ved. It is ~uch 
eas ier to reach a co:npr omise in a b ilateral prob l em than 
~ ould be the c ase if the prob l em we re multi latera l. The 
P orth ~meri c an Monetar y lgr ee'Tient c an , t herefore, be r eF son-
ably expe cted to be a more effe ct i v e means to exchange rate 
stability . 
j h istorical study of the Canadian ex c h n e rate 
p rob l e:n reveal s the tende n cy of t he exchan~e rate to f l uctu-
ate in r e sponse to shif ts i n the ba l ance of internation l 
paynents . The :nos t si c;nifi c a nt pe riod for anal ysis p urp o ses 
is the years 1930 t c 1 939 when the Canadian do l lar was co -
o rative l y .f r ee of ex change controls of any kind . The clos e 
r e l 2.tionship between the c urrent be.l nee of payments 2nd the 
exchange r ate is reveal ed by an examination of Chart # l 
(page 71 ) . The propo sed plan sugcests a ~ore effective me t hod 
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of controllin6 t he fluctuations in the exchan ge r a te. It 
2 l so su; ;_~ es ts e cono:nic p l annin3 de s igned to prevent the er -
r a tic fluctuations in t he current ba l ance of p aynents be t ween 
t he t ~ o coun tries. If s re s ter equil ibriun can be established 
be tween i~port s fro~ , and exoorts to, the United ~tat es, then 
dolla r shortages wi ll be less like l y to occur . 
Canada experienced fe w d iff iculti es in ma intainins 
a stabi li zed exchange rate during t he ~:ar years . 'l'his was, 
of course , ~ade p ossibl e by t h e trene ndous excess of e xp or ts 
over i:npor t s. .<13.r p roduction r esulted in rn exce ,J tionally 
l a r 3 e reserve of United St a tes dol l a rs. Becaus e t h is l ar g e 
r e s erve existed, and in order t o a void the inf l ationar y Uend 
in t he Onited St a tes, Canada r es tored ~er dol lar to parity 
with the A~erican dollEr in the year 1 946 . I~prope r timi ng 
of t he return to p.so.rity was fol lowed by a seve re drain upon 
doll a.r reserves . l cnpor t restrictions were e stablished in 
l a te 1 947 with 2 r e sult that the outf low of do l l a rs was r e -
versed . ~lthough her doll ar p osition was favor ab l e , Canada 
wa s f orced to d e p r e ciate her d olla r 9 per cent l ate in 1 949 . 
rhis a ction f ol lowed i~mediate ly after Britain deprecia t ed 
the pound s terling . The ne ';, excha r e; e rat e proved to be too 
low, an d on October 6 , 1 950 , the Canadi an doll a r wa s fr e ed 
f rom any fixed exchange rate . It appears to be inevitab l e 
t ha t furthe r ad justments wi ll b e necessary under t he present 
system. As a :natter of f a ct, the Canadian ; overn:nent in 
freein; t he dolla r a ssured the Internationa l ~one t ry F und 
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t ha t a fixed par of exchange wou l d be est a blished as soon a s 
circu~s tances per~itted. 
The p roposed North American ~onetary Agr&e~ent , sup -
p ort e d by the Equaliz a tion Ac count and the Econo ni c Plannin~ 
Board, would seek to reduc& both the frequency and the se -
verity of exchange r a te f l uctuations . In order to ac complish 
t he s e objectives, Canada and the United States would endeavor 
to corre l ate their financia l a nd ec ono~ic po l icies. 
B. Conclusion 
\. hether it be :11i li tary or e conoynic, ny a [:,re ement 
between n2. ti ons, in order to be efficacious, mus t i-mpose ob -
li ~a tions upon e a ch participant . Obligations , however, 
shoul d not be assumed li Ght l y either by individuals nor by 
~overn~ents. liach ~articiPant nation shoul d be convinced tha t 
t he obli za tions being assumed are out ,ei ghed by benefits that 
will be received under the proposed Egreen ent . This is ad -
mittedly a materialistic vi e wp oint . However, if this funda -
ment&. l idea does not underlie an internatione.l a [ reemt:nt, the 
probabi lities of the a~re ement being successful in the long 
run are ; re at l y diminished . 
It shoul d be obvious a t this point that Canada will 
receive gr eater benefits fro 11 t h e proposed plan iiE.n wi ll t he 
United States. The Canadian econo:1J.y is to a ~uch greater de -
~ree dependent upon ~utual trad e than is the Uni ted States. 
The hi;h stand .rd of living in Canada could not be mcintained 
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if it we re no t for the volu~e of that trade . On the other 
bend, trade with Cenade repres e n t s only a s~all perc enta~e of 
t h e total 0nited States do~estic and forei ~n tr2de. If trL.de 
betw6en Canada end t he United Stat es ce ased al to ~ether, it is 
conceivabl e that t he l et t er country ~isht deve lop other mar -
kets and other sources of su~ply , without bringi n 7 economi c 
disaster do~e st ically . 
Granting then t hat stnbi l izin6 the exchange rate 
wi ll acce l erete trade between the t wo countries , :t is Canada 
who will r eap t he greater benefit i f the p l an is successful. 
If the principl e outlined in the fi r st paregr2.ph is app lied, 
the con c lusion l ogi cally fol lows that Canada shoul d make t he 
;reEter sacrifjces and incur the '-"reHtest obliga t ions under 
the proposed p l an . 
On a per c ap i t basis , t he cost of the prot;ra:n 
should be nuch higher for Canadians tban fo r cit izens of the 
United States . Administration costs would be relatively in-
si::,nificl'lnt co'"l!p re d 'Hi th the cost of s uppoP t inc. t he C nadia.n 
dollar c t a fixed DE,ri t y if a fund ament a l disequi l.ibrium ap -
neared . Canade would ultimat ely pay the bill f or t he exc hange 
subsidy under the proposed p l an . The re is no econo:nic justi -
fication for e. p l an ·which s ugt:;es ts t hat t he A:ner ican taxpayer 
shoul d share any p ortion of such a subsidy . However , an im-
portant feat u re of the progre~ is that America ~ ould expres s 
h er confidence in the financia l stren~th of Canada by under -
writ i n g the obli gations incurred by Canada as a result of t he 
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op e ration of t h e Equ al ization Account . Because potential 
reserv e s of t h e Account woul d be so :_:: r e at, currency and s e c u -
r i t y specula tion would be discour s ed . Certainly speculation 
i n its e l f would b e unab le to force a chang e in the e xch eng e 
I n the first st <-~ e of operations, it i s reco.n:ne nded 
the t a n a rrow r e~3e b e estab l ish ed r a ther than a fix e d parity. 
Onera t ions of the Yqu e.l izP tion , ccount woul d b e d esi :::_n e d to 
p r e vent fluct uat i ons a b ove an d be low t h e re.n2_ e l imits. A 
r anse r a the r tha n e fi x ed p a rity is sug gested because of t h e 
d iffic u lti e s of precise l y determining an equitabl e rate . In 
t he econd st ge, a fi x ed parity woul d be es t cbl ished and 
ma i ntained . F rom this p oint on, it is assumed that the work 
of t he Economic fl annin~ Boar d will b e c in to produ ce results . 
'I'~1is v: i ll 11e an ~reater equilibrium in t he bal ance of p&y-
~ents . Gre a t e r e qui l ibrium, in turn , ~i l l j us t ify fractional 
increase s in the: e x chang e r a te . Ul timat e l y, dollar - for-
dollar parity c an be achieved . 
Success of t h e plan will depend u p on Canada's wi l l-
in.~;ne s s to integr a te i ts economy with t ha t of the United 
St e. te s . She cannot have a r e.dical l y different price and 
w a~e l e vel . f or can sh e exp ect to enjoy prosperity whi l e 
t he United ~tates is b e.ving a recession . .'l h ile t h e p lan 1 s 
adoption auto~- tically means Cana dian a c qui es cence upon 
t he se particular p oints , i t is d oubtful wheth er an y o t her 
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s ~rs te :r1 of exchange contr ol could neutralize t he effects of 
business conditions in t he Uni ted Sta t e s uDon the Canad i a n 
econo:ny . 
Bo th countries ~ould have to be wi lling to sacri -
fice oome of their histor i c a l i e as in re gard to tariffs, 
::::;uota s, and import r e strictions if the p l an i s to work ef -
ficiently . This , too, will require greate r sacrifices by 
Canada t han by t he Unit ed State s . Canada he s used thes e de -
vices extensive l y in the past to brin ab out ~reate r e quili b -
rium in he r current interna tional ba l ances. 
~:neric a, under t he p roposed o l n, could expect to 
increase her trade with Canada . I t is p robable t ha t co:npo -
nent narts of Canad ian i mp orts from t he Uni ted Sts.tes wou l d 
be Ed tered so:newha t, but t he total vol ume should increas e . 
he re can be no doub t that t he prosperity of either c ount r y 
v1i ll be beneficia l to the othe r. The institution of this 
p l an could conce i vab l y l ead to the establ i shment of a free 
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